Conceptual Marketing Corporation – PETROFILM.COM Oslo April 2022 апрель 2022 г. 2022 年 4 月 آوریل 2022 EMPATHY RESPECT DIGNITYANALYSIS, INFORMATIONS FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE طلاعات تجزیه و تحلیل از یک چشم انداز اروپاییعزت احترام به همدلی یکپارچه سازیتجزیه و تحلیل ، اطلاعات از یک چشم انداز اروپاییEMPATHIE RESPECTEER WAARDIGHEIDANALYSE, INFORMATIE VANUIT EEN EUROPEES PERSPECTIEFEMPATHIE RESPECT DIGNITÉANALYSE, INFORMATIONS D’UNE PERSPECTIVE EUROPÉENNE EMPATÍA RESPETO DIGNIDADANÁLISIS, INFORMACIONES CON PERSPECTIVA DE EUROPAСОБСТВЕННОСТЬ УВАЖЕНИЕ ДОСТОИНСТВА АНАЛИЗ ИНФОРМАЦИИ С ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ ИЗ ЕВРОПЫ 誠信尊重尊嚴 分析，來自歐洲的信息 Welcome!Herzlich willkommen! Bienvenido! добро пожаловать! ようこそ! Bienvenue! 歡迎 أهلا بك The Grand European Plain It stretches from the Pyrenees Mountains and the French coast of the Bay of Biscay in the West to the Russian Ural Mountains in the East.EUROPE ЕВРОПА603.8 Million people – 603,8 миллиона человек – 6.038億人 歐洲 اروپا CLICK MAP PLAY EUROPEAN ANTHEMCLICK FLAG PLAY EUROPEAN UNIONThe European Union: 445 MillionCLICK EFTA LOGO FOR VIDEOThe European Free Trade Association EFTA: 13.6 MillionCLICK FLAG FOR RUSSIA BELARUSThe Russian Federation West of Ural: 101.6 Million CLICK FLAG FOR BREXIT VIDEOThe United Kingdom: 66.6 Million THE UNITED STATES Department of Justice weekly news update.United States Leads Seizure of One of the World’s Largest Hacker Forums and Arrests Administrator04/12/2022 12:00 AM EDTThe Department of Justice today announced the seizure of the RaidForums website, a popular marketplace for cybercriminals to buy and sell hacked data, and unsealed criminal charges against RaidForums’ founder and chief administrator, Diogo Santos Coelho, 21, of Portugal. Coelho was arrested in the United Kingdom on Jan. 31, at the United States’ request and remains in custody pending the resolution of his extradition proceedings. Physician Partners of America to Pay 24.5 Million to Settle Allegations of Unnecessary Testing, Improper Remuneration to Physicians and a False Statement in Connection with COVID-19 Relief Funds04/12/2022 12:00 AM EDTPhysician Partners of America LLC PPOA, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, its founder, Rodolfo Gari, and its former chief medical officer, Dr. Abraham Rivera, have agreed to pay 24.5 million to resolve allegations that they violated the False Claims Act by billing federal healthcare programs for unnecessary medical testing and services, paying unlawful remuneration to its physician employees and making a false statement in connection with a loan obtained through the Small Business Administration’s SBA Paycheck Protection Program PPP. Husband and Wife Arrested for Export Control Violations, Wire Fraud, Tax Fraud and Making False Statements04/12/2022 12:00 AM EDTA Texas man and woman were arrested today in Helotes on criminal charges related to the husband’s involvement in alleged export violations and both of their alleged involvement in a scheme to defraud a research and development company R&D Company that provided services to industrial and government clients in the United States and abroad. U.S. Citizen Who Conspired to Assist North Korea in Evading Sanctions Sentenced to Over Five Years and Fined 100,00004/12/2022 12:00 AM EDTA U.S. Citizen who conspired to provide services to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DPRK or North Korea, including technical advice on using cryptocurrency and blockchain technology to evade sanctions, was sentenced to 63 months in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act IEEPA. Assistant Attorney General Kristen Clarke Announces Consent Decree with City of Springfield, Massachusetts04/13/2022 12:00 AM EDTGood morning. I am joined by United States Attorney Rachael Rollins, Springfield Mayor Domenic Sarno and Springfield Police Superintendent Cheryl Clapprood. South Florida Bookkeeper Sentenced to Over 12 Years in Federal Prison for Support of International Enterprise that Operated Sexually Exploitive “Child Modeling” Websites04/13/2022 12:00 AM EDTA Florida woman was sentenced today to 151 months in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for her work for and support of subscription-based sexually exploitative “child modeling” websites. The court also ordered the defendant to forfeit more than 2.2 million, as well as real property located in Weston, Florida. Pharmacy Owner Sentenced to Prison for Health Care Fraud04/13/2022 12:00 AM EDTA New York woman was sentenced today to 78 months in prison for defrauding health care programs, including more than 6.5 million from Medicare Part D plans and Medicaid drug plans. Russian Legislator and Two Staff Members Charged with Conspiring to Have U.S. Citizen Act as an Illegal Agent of the Russian Government in the United States04/14/2022 12:00 AM EDTThree citizens of the Russian Federation Russia are charged in an indictment, which was unsealed today, with conspiring to use an agent of Russia in the United States without prior notice to the Attorney General, conspiring to violate U.S. Sanctions, and conspiring to commit visa fraud. Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta, Recipient of the 2022 Honorable Charles R. Richey Equal Justice Award, Delivers Remarks at GW Law04/14/2022 12:00 AM EDTThank you, Professor Saltzburg, for that warm introduction. I also want to thank President Mark Wrighton, Associate Dean Morrison, the George Washington GW University School of Law and the GW University Community for inviting me here today. Gypsy Joker Outlaw Motorcycle Club Members Sentenced to Life in Prison for Kidnapping, Torturing, and Murdering Former Club Member04/15/2022 12:00 AM EDTTwo members of the Gypsy Joker Outlaw Motorcycle Club GJOMC were sentenced to life in federal prison yesterday for kidnapping, torturing, and murdering a former club member.THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTSThe Strasbourg Court, France. The International Criminal Court icc The Hague, Netherlands Article 25: Individual Criminal ResponsibilityThe Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the Rome Statute. 1 In accordance with the Rome Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible; 2 Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission; 3 In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. 4 In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide; Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EU Charter Article 11 Freedom of Expression Everyone has the right to Freedom of Expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. UN Article 23 Right to Work Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.UN Article 21 Non-DiscriminationAny discrimination based on sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic traits, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES VI CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITYThe Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity would be guarded by an international legal shield and that even a Head of State would be held criminally responsible and punished for aggression and Crimes Against Humanity such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done, or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime. Through its harassments and deportation of the Norwegian Jews Norway has violated Nuremberg Principles VI, and specifically the Norwegian Police is guilty and was never brought to justice for these heinous crimes against humanity. An apology does not absolve guilt. CLICK HERE ORE RESOURCE CENTER BELOWTHE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY EUROPEPETROFILM.COMEMPATHY RESPECT DIGNITYEUROPE ЕВРОПАHelmut KohlCHANCELLOR OF GERMANY’S UNITY AND THE EURO Click picture Play videoHelmut Kohl was the Chancellor who voted for the Euro, created dialogue and common ground with Russa and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and again in 1992. ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVEPETROFILM.COMInstitute for Empathic Dialogue Creation and Conflict ResolutionHarald Dahle-SladekFounder and Editor-in-chiefОснователь и главный редакторبنیانگذار و مدیرمسئول創始人兼主編 Want a larger picture? Press Ctrl + scroll wheel.Хотите большую картинку? Нажмите Ctrl + колесо прокрутки.想要更大的圖片？按 Ctrl + 滾輪 SIMASSecurity Incident Management Analysis SystemData mining from Government servers constitutes a serious crime and should be prosecuted. However, the United States’ State Department should be careful not to exploit its Security Incident Management Analysis System, SIMAS in a dehumanizing way. It is a fact that Norwegian police and intelligence operatives work hand-in-glove with the United States Embassy in Oslo mining a huge amount of personal data from ordinary Norwegian citizens. Thus, violating §90, the Spy paragraph, which states that “working for a foreign power is a serious crime and is punishable.” Breaking the United Nations Human Rights and the Fundamental Charter of the European Union on personal protection is a serious crime too. Before criticizing codebreakers and journalists around the world, the United States should first scrutinize its own endeavors. You can’t live crooked and think straight, weather you’re a chauffeur or a Chief of State! The Law applies equally to everyone. U.S. EMBASSIES AS WORLD-WIDE SPY PLATFORMS?Norway has long been a close ally of the USA. Outside of the EU, but inside NATO, it provided bases and consistent support for the USA during the Cold War, unsurprisingly seeing neighboring USSR as a serious threat to its interests. Yet, those days would seem to be long gone, at least as far as the US is concerned, if a story recently revealed is to be believed. With revelations that U.S. Embassies in Oslo, Copenhagen, and Stockholm have carried out spying operations against the host citizens of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden from the respective embassies, comes news to WMR that the system carrying out the secret surveillance the Security Incident Management Analysis System or SIMAS – not only also spies on citizens of the two Nordic partners of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, namely Iceland and Finland, from U.S. Embassies in Reykjavik and Helsinki, respectively, but spies on individuals from all U.S. Embassies and consulates around the world from Santiago, Chile, and Canberra, Australia, to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to Maputo, Mozambique. According to the Dagbladet newspaper, Norway’s TV2 News reported that 15-20 Norwegians, including ex-police, had been recruited by the US Embassy over 10 years to form a secret group, the Surveillance Detection Unit SDU that would apparently monitor terrorist threats in Norway. The group operated from a building near the embassy, and collected information on hundreds of Norwegian citizens, whose details were added to a database called Security Incident Management Analysis System, SIMAS. The Finnish paper, Helsingin Sanomat, is reporting that the Finnish Security Police SUPO has asked U.S. Authorities about the activities of SIMAS in Helsinki. One nation that has adopted a sanguine reaction to the U.S. Embassy spy program is Denmark, described by one intelligence insider as a “zone of control” for U.S. Surveillance activities in Scandinavia. The cooperation between the U.S. And Denmark in surveillance operations began under Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. This was one of the reasons he was rewarded by Washington with the job of Secretary General of NATO. The Norwegian and Swedish governments have demanded answers to questions from U.S. Authorities about SIMAS spying but State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley, a retired Air Force colonel who has historically been assigned by the CIA to oversee the Clintons, whether at the White House or, now, at the State Department, claimed that the government of Norway had been informed by the United States of SIMAS surveillance from a Surveillance Detection Unit SDU located in a building near the U.S. Embassy in Oslo. On November 4, Crowley was asked at a State Department press conference about his earlier statement that Norway had been informed about SIMAS. The question-and-answer session: “Q . . . On Monday when I asked you, you said that the Norwegian Government was aware of these activities. They say they are not. So, who’s lying here?” A. “I’m, we, the security of our Embassy involves cooperation between our security officials and Norwegian security officials. I’ll just stand by those words.” Q. “You have rented a building outside Norwegian your Embassy in Norway, in Oslo, and filled it with Norwegian police officers and also Norwegian military officers?” A. “That is a question you have to direct to our Embassy min Oslo; I haven’t been there in a while, so I can’t provide you any insight.” Q. “But just to follow up, both the State Department in Norway and also the Justice Department in Norway said they’re not aware that you have some activities outside your Embassy building. Why haven’t you informed the Norwegian Government?” A. “Well, look, embassy diplomatic posts all over the world are ripe targets for a terrorist attack, whether they’re U.S. Embassies, whether they are the embassies of other governments. It is right and proper that we would take appropriate steps to protect our diplomatic posts anywhere around the world, and we would expect any government to do the same, whether it’s somewhere over out overseas or here in the United States. So we have a program where we look carefully to make to evaluate if we believe our Embassy is under observation and potentially under threat. We share that information across the United States Government. But as appropriate, we share that information with our host government partners. The essence of addressing this challenge which confronts the United States and other countries in the West is the very kind of intelligence cooperation and law enforcement cooperation that has been a hallmark of our alliances for a number of years. So how much the host nation government knows about specific activities, I can’t say. But everything that we do is fully consistent with our security arrangements that we have with any host nation government anywhere in the world, including Norway.” Q. “Is there written agreements about this?” A. “I can’t say. At this point, I would just refer further questions back to our Embassy in Norway.” Media reports that U.S. Embassy spying on civilians has been going on for the past 10 years, since 2000. A State Department Privacy Impact Assessment PIA submitted on January 5, 2010, states, “The Security Incident Management and Analysis System SIMAS is a worldwide Bureau of Diplomatic Security DS web-based application, which serves as a repository for all suspicious activity and crime reporting from U.S. Diplomatic Missions abroad all U.S. Embassies and consulates. Department of State personnel, including Diplomatic Security personnel, regional security officers, and cleared foreign nationals, enter Suspicious Activity Reports SARs into SIMAS as a central repository for all physical security incidents overseas. SIMAS Reports typically contain a detailed narrative description of the suspicious activity prompting the report, available suspicious persons and vehicle descriptors, and other identification data as may be available e.g. Photographs. Reports also indicate date, time and location of suspicious activity, and may include amplifying comments from relevant Bureau offices.” In other words, SIMAS is global and, in some cases, cleared nationals of foreign nations have access to the SIMAS system. The State Department was recruiting local foreign nationals to work with SIMAS in Accra, Ghana; Bujumbura, Burundi; and Sydney, Australia. Even U.S. Citizens abroad are subjected to being subjected to spying by SIMAS. The PIA also states: “SIMAS collects and maintains the following types of PII personally-identifiable information on members of the public, foreign nationals, U.S. Government employees, and contractors who are identified as being directly or indirectly involved in or associated with suspicious activities and/or criminal allegations near USG property. All types of information may not be collected on each specific group of individuals. However, it may be possible for all forms of PII to be collected on an individual.” SIMAS data is also shared with the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, Department of Treasury, Department of Defense including the National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Health and Human Services, the Capitol Police, and all other US embassies and consulates around the world. Although the PIA states that SIMAS data is retained by the Diplomatic Security Bureau accord-ing to a set retention schedule and is not shared for purposes other than crime and terrorism prevention, the same cannot be said for the other agencies that access and retain SIMAS data, including the CIA, FBI, and NSA. The State Department PIA concludes that, “SIMAS has been designed to minimize risk to privacy data.” That is hard to believe considering the global access permitted to the system, as well as the fact that not only do a dozen or more U.S. Agencies have access to the data but so also do foreign nationals. So, if you are in Winnipeg or Warsaw, Lusaka or Lisbon, or Malabo or Paramaribo, and you stroll past the U.S. Embassy or consulate, “smile, you’re on clandestine camera and now in the SIMAS database. Protecting our freedomU.S. SPACE FENCELockheed Martin, AMEC Foster Wheeler, General Dynamics, SATCOM, Northrop Grumman Dear readers,In the 1960’ies, ’70ies and ”80ies there was something called “Early Warning” which should give us some time to calculate a proper response. Not anymore! Today we have “instant-detection-send-and-response” phased array-radars. They give us an even better, faster and more accurate situation report. What took minutes before, take seconds and fraction of a second today. U.S. Space Fence is protecting our freedom in a much more reliable and sophistical way than before, and the best part it’s here to stay! We thank the United States of America! Remain alert folks! Keep your eyes and ears open! Fight terrorism, domestic and foreign, at least in your spirit. Have a good day. GLOBUS III Mechanical Phased Array Radar on Vardø Island North NorwayCovers Ninety degrees East ICBM’s from Plesetsk to Kura and South to Kwajalein.Space Fence The Space Fence program is a new acquisition that will produce three world-wide-dispersed radar sites. The radars will provide the ability to perform un-cued tracking of small objects at low and medium orbital altitudes. The Space Fence program was begun by the US Navy to replace the current VHF Fence radar system. In 2003, the Navy transferred the program to the Air Force. In the intervening years, the Air Force has refined the require-ments for the program to make the resulting radars more capable than a simple VHF Fence replacement. The program is in concept development, with an expected IOC for the first site of 2015. GLOBUS II SLEP The GLOBUS II radar is a dedicated sensor that provides metric tracking and imaging of near-Earth and deep space satellites. It provides the only all-weather, 24/7 space track capability covering 0-90 degrees east longitude. The radar is located in Vardo Norway. It is one of five wide-band imaging radars in the SSN. The Sensor Service Life Extension Programs SLEPsin this program element fund efforts to upgrade and extend the life of operational Space Situation Awareness SSA sensors, as needed. These SLEPs include, but are not limited to, programs that extend the serviceable life of assets and maintain critical capability by replacing aging and increasingly unsustain- able components with modern equipment. SLEPs may incorporate equipment which inher-ently includes technological advances resulting in enhanced or increased capabilities. In addition, the SLEP itself may be designed to increase certain capabilities. The current efforts of Eglin, Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar HUSIR, Ground-based Electro Optical Deep Space Surveillance GEODSS, and GLOBUS III are representative of sensor systems upgraded in the SLEP project. As the need arises in the execution year, funds in this project may be used to begin sensor life extension programs on additional efforts. These efforts are in Budget Activity 7, Operational System Development, because they develop modifications for operational SSA sensors. Originally known as HAVE STARE AN/FPS-129, the radar became operational in 1995 at Vandenberg Air Force base in California. While there, it observed several intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM flight tests a as well as two non-intercept tests of the kill vehicle for U.S. National missile defense interceptor then under development IFT-1A and IFT-2. Beginning in late 1998, HAVE STARE was dismantled and moved to Vardo, and renamed Globus II and appears to have become operational in about 2003. A radar named Globus, had been operated since the 1960s by Norway at Vardo, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, and was used to monitor Soviet and Russian ballistic missile flight tests. Outside observers have argued that Globus II is likely to be used to gather information on Russian ballistic missile tests, and that such information could be useful for ballistic missile defense. However, official Norwegian government statements stated that the radar would be used operated by only Norwegian personnel and would be used to track and monitor objects, including space debris in space, research and development, and “Surveillance of the Norwegian area of interest, including the technical gathering of intelligence.”THE UNITED STATESEglin AFB Click picture and PlayHarris Corporation – AN/FPS-85 Radar Cover Replacement Time Lapse, Eglin Air Force BaseINSTANT RESPONSE RADARS Globus III, Eglin FPS-85, Cobra Dane, Kwajalein Altair & Millstone Hill are five of the most valuable sensors today. The Russian FederationPLESETSK COSMODROMEPlesetsk is used especially for military satellites placed into high inclination and polar orbits since the range for falling debris is clear to the north which is largely uninhabited Arctic and polar terrain. It is situated in a region of taiga, or flat terrain with boreal pine forests.Coat of Arms ArchangelskOn October 26, 2017 Russia conducted its annual strategic forces exercise. The exercise invol-ved a launch of a Topol/SS-25 ICBM from Plesetsk. The warhead is said to successfully reach its target at Kura. ICBM BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCH SITEFrom Plesetsk in Arkhangelsk to Kura on Kamchatka.CLICK PICTURE AND PLAYThe exercise involved a launch of a Topol/SS-25 ICBM from Plesetsk. The warhead is said to successfully reach its target at Kura. Below Plesets Cosmodrome.Coat of Arms Palana KamchatkaGreater Coat of Arms of Alaska COBRA DANE, SHEMYA ISLANDClick and PlayThe Cobra Dane Phased Array Radar on Shemya Island Shemya Island about 2,414 kilometers from Anchorage, Alaska, and is part of the Near Islands group at the tip of the Aleutian Island chain. Shemya Island occupies approximately 1,425 hectares and is part of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and is operated by the U.S. Air Force. A person who worked there says, “I did my overseas deployment on Shemya from January 1963 to January 1964. It was a very unusual place. It is the only place I have ever heard of where one can experience heavy fog, tremendous winds, and snow, sleet, or rain all at once. We once endured a storm where the wind speed was measured at 105 mph when the anemometer blew away.” He continues with his story, “The work we did was fascinating. I would not have traded my experience there for anything, although I did not appreciate it nearly as much then as I do now. The Army, Air Force, and Navy people working on Shemya can be justifiably proud of what they contributed to our winning the Cold War.” Electrical equipment in the subarray face of the Cobra Dane radar systemThe computer room for the Cobra Dane radar system during the Cold war. Shemya Island has been developed by the military and continues to operate as an Intelligence Radar site whose principal purpose involves monitoring space and mis-sile activities. The base is under control of the Eareckson Air Station Program Management Office, part of the 611th Air Support Group at Elmendorf Air Force Base Alalska. Eareckson Air Station is an isolated self-contained military installation, and it has no surrounding communities. DEFENDING OUR FREEDOMCOBRA DANE RADAR COVERAGEEareckson Air Station Shemya IslandThe Cobra Dane Phased Array Radar on Eareckson Air Station Shemya Island. Eareckson Air Station is a United States Air Force military airport located on the island of Shemya, in the Alaskan Aleutian Islands. Established in May of 1943 as a forward operating base for long-range bomber aircraft of the US Army Air Force to conduct bombing missions on Japanese positions in the Kurile Islands, the base was heavily utilized until war’s end, with the present-day runway being added to the airfield to support the operations a planned squadron of B-29 Superfortresses flying missions ag-ainst mainland Japan as part of Operation Downfall. “From its establishment in early 2002 through the end of 2010, the Missile Defense Agency is fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System consisting of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors for long-range homeland defense. Aegis warships capable of long-range surveillance and tracking and missile intercepts. Standard Missile-3 interceptors for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense warships. Upgraded Cobra Dane radar in the Aleutian Islands.” Upgraded early warning radars, currently Beale Air Force Base, Calif., Fylingdales, U.K., and Thule, Green-land. 11 transportable X-band radars for operations and testing. Sea-based X-band radar now located in the Pacific Ocean to support flight testing and actual defensive operations. Integrated Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element across the BMDS.COBRA DANEThe certain principal use of this X-band radar, along with a second one for Eareckson Air Station on Shemya Island, some 2414Km southwest of An-chorage, will be to collect detailed intelligence data on Russia¹s long-range ballistic missiles. This data will cover the entire trajectory of the missiles, and will be of primal value to a U.S. NMD system. THE COBRA DANE PHASED ARRAY RADAR ON SHEMYA ISLANDThe 21st Operations Group was reactivated on 15 May 1992 as a component of the redesig-nated and reactivated 21st Space Wing, providing command management of Air Force Space Command’s worldwide network of assigned missile warning, space surveillance, and communications units.The 21st Operations Group assumed the Cobra Dane Radar mission at Eareckson Air Station, Shemya Island, Alaska, April 1. Eareckson AS is located on the western tip of Alaska’s Aleutian islands. The radar has the ability to detect objects about 2,000 miles away, and provides data for the Space Surveillance Network and the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Cobra Dane will continue to be operated by a contract workforce, and no military personnel will be assigned to the unit at Eareckson Air Station. Full cover of Russian missile testingCobra Dane security patrolNorway Traveling in theBarents Euro-Arctic Region Along the Norwegian coast from Bergen via Nordkapp to Kirkenes and back, 12 days.Seal of the arctic city of Tromsø, NorwayTravel log by Harald Dahle The region in question here is called the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. This northern-most region sweeps through Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia with its northern borders pointed directly towards the humongous Barents Sea. The region is the arctic part of the European Mainland Continent where it suddenly drops down in the ocean and disappears. This abrupt ending of mainland Europe into the ice cold and deep Barents Sea, is a dramatic confirmation of the geological processes that once have taken place here, and a stern reminder to us uber civilized souls that all things must come to an end.The Barents Euro-Arctic Region comprises the countries Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia Suddenly, and with no warning, Europe as we know it, is finished! Experiencing this first hand oneself will make a considerable psychological impact on the traveler, daring to approach this “ghostly” area. Particularly during the winter months between November, December and January. Why travel in the winter? I did the round trip on board the coastal ferry “Richard With”,from December 23 to January 6 in 1993. And as such I claim to have “hands-on” winter experience. The Polar Circle is located between the two stops Nesna in the south and Ørnes further north. Traveling in the winter is a traveling in the gray scale of light. Up at Honningsvåg, I remember the sun as “fragile streams of soft light bouncing through layers of woolen clouds”. At an angle of 12-15 degrees, bearing West-North-East – lasting three hours maximum, before gray turned to pitch-black darkness again. Click picture Watch: “Hunting the Northern Lights in Norway!”The majestic coastal ferry, “MS Richard With” plowing through the sea at full speed ahead! And to be there and to experience it, is “to be on the Moon” – Gone are the modern metropolises in shining glass, towering concrete and beaming lights of all kinds, from all directions at the same time. Here, up north at the very edge of civilization, nature speaks directly to you – and you listen carefully! And so it goes. From one stop northwards to the next stop. Snow falling, ship maneuvering slowly through sometimes shallow straits. The captains on these coastal ferries are themselves sons of captains, who also maneuvered these ships. Big sand banks outstretched beneath the hull move around, and the narrow passages above are maneuvered with maximum alertness. “Fragile streams of soft light bouncing through layers of woolen clouds” The light is there. But it’s a different kind of light. Passing North Cape, there is nothing between the edge of the European continent and the North Pole. The wind sweeps over, the light must follow nature’s cycle. Suddenly, the little human being is “taken” by the colossal meeting with something so much bigger than oneself. This is a spectacle to observe, not to argue with. Traveling in the winter along the Norwegian coast is an investment in psychological awareness and depth, a unique chance to experience life in shades of gray and faint-color light.On 19th of October, a rainy city in Northern Russia welcomed travelers from all across the Barents countries and beyond. The historical city of Arkhangelsk once again had something to show to the world – a relationship of four nations and their cooperation remarkable to the people living in the North. An important event was about to take place, as Russia handed over the chairmanship of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council BEAC to Sweden.And the cold! Between -12 till -27, wind not included. Bring a very thick winter coat! People along the coast come on board to look – invite you for coffee. They did with me! That is only in the winter when the ferry is half full, or one third full, depending. On board, the food is excellent, and when crossing the Polar Circle, you will be baptized with ice water in front of cheering dinner guests in the spacious dining room. And that water is freezing! After the voyage is competed and you are safely back in Bergen on the west coast, you, like myself will feel “reborn and energized again” – and you will never forget what you have just experienced in your reptilian brain. Because, this voyage is not an experience meant for the cognitive side of the brain, nor is it ment to be an illusion of faraway Disneyland. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates at Elmendorf AFBU.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and wife Becky are greeted by Air Force Lt. Gen. Dana T. Atkins, commander of Alaskan Command, during his visit to Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, June 1, 2009. ELMENDORF AFBJoint Base Elmendorf-Richardson That importance was further recognized when the F-15E Strike Eagle equip-ped 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron was reassigned to Elmendorf Air Force Base from Clark Air Base in the Philppines in May 1991. The Pacific Regional Medical Center moved from Clark to Elmendorf and construction of a new, greatly expanded hospital began in 1993. The early 1990s also saw major organizational changes and an expansion of Elmendorf’s imp-ortance. In 1991, the 21st Tactical Fighter Wing was reorganized as an objective wing and all the major tenant units on Elmendorf were placed under it. The 21st Wing was inactivated and the 3d Wing was reassigned from Clark Air Base to Elmendorf Air Force Base on 19 December 1991. This was in keeping with the Air Force’s polices of retaining the oldest and most illustrious units during a period of major force reductions. It was also an alternative landing site for the Space Shuttle. The base also contains the headquarters of the Alaska Wing of the Civil Air Patrol.Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson Below, Boeing C-17 Globemaster III from Elmendorf AFBFORT GREELY ALASKAGROUND BASED INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FACILITIESU.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to U.S. Army Col. George Bond, Missile Defense Agency’s top officer at the ground based interceptor missile facilities in Alaska, June 1, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry MorrisonU.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates climbs down into a ground-based interceptor missile silo on Fort Greely, Alaska, June 1, 2009. GUARD – ENGAGE – DESTROYFORT GREELY ALASKAINTERCEPTOR MISSILE FIELDThe Groundbased Midcourse Defense systemIt is the largest, fastest, and most intelligent projectile available to the US Army. Despite this you probably never heard of it nor the Army National Guard Soldiers who “pull the lanyard.” If you think a 155mm howitzer shell is big, the M21 rifle is accurate, the MLRS can fire over a long distance, or that the PATRIOT air defense system is sophisticated, you are correct on all accounts. There is one system operated by the Army National Guard however, that dwarfs any of its nearest competitors. That system is the Groundbased Midcourse Defense system and it has been operational for more than a decade with Army National Guard Soldiers from Colorado, Alaska, and California’s 100th Missile Defense Brigade. The tip of the spear for the GMD system is its Groundbased Interceptor, or simply “GBI.” While it may not be the most awe-inspiring name for a defensive weapon system, its performance in conjunction with its fire control system will certainly leave you in awe. The GMD system is the ultimate “smart weapon.” The GBI consists of a 3-stage solid rocket boost vehicle which can place it’s payload of an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle outside the earth’s atmosphere. In order to do this the missile must reach an escape velocity of more than 6.9 miles per second. This hypersonic speed is several times what a 7.62mm bullet travels leaving the muzzle of a gun. To put it another way, it reaches a speed of approximately Mach 33. Groundbased Interceptor being emplaced at the Missile Defense Complex, Fort Greely, Alaska MULTI SENSORSOnce outside the atmosphere and at distances thousands of miles from the launch facilities at Vandenberg AFB, Calif, or Fort Greely, Alaska, the boost vehicle releases the EKV on an intercept trajectory toward a hostile missile’s warhead. From there, the EKV seeks out the target using multi-color sensors, a cutting-edge onboard computer, and a series of rocket motors used for independent steering in space. The EKV homes in on its target with pinpoint accuracy and destroys it using nothing more than the force of a massive collision hit to kill without the need of a traditional warhead or explosives. It is like hitting a bullet with a bullet, but these bullets are launched thous- ands of miles apart and are moving at Mach 33. It is ferociously complicated, but it works. Here’s why. The GBI is just the most visible aspect to the cutting-edge GMD system. GMD is a “system of systems” involving shooters, sensors, and Command, Control and Communication systems. Satellite communication ground station at the Missile Defense Complex, Fort GreelyWhile the GBIs comprise the shooter portion of the system, the sensors are the eyes and ears of GMD. These sensors consist of space-based infra-red satellites, upgraded early warning radars UEWRs and COBRA Dane operated by the Air Force, transpor-table X-band radars AN/TPY-2, AEGIS radar on board select U.S. Navy warships, and the massive sea-based X-band Radar. These sensors provide information to the GMD Fire Control system in order to calculate precise intercept points for the GBIs and EKVs.The Army National Guard Soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade in Colorado and California, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion in Alaska operate the Command, Control and Communication portion of GMD system and are the essential human element of GMD. Missile Defense Element crews from the 100th and Fire Direction Center crews from the 49th man the system 24/7/365. They are responsible for the strategic and tactical level execution of the GMD mission and provide security forces to defend the assets at Fort Greely, Alaska. The Soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade are part of a very unique multi-component organization. The brigade headquarters is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado and consists mainly of full-time Active Guard and Reserve, Colorado Army National Guardsmen. The unit also includes a small contingent of Active Component Regular Army Soldiers. The 100th is tasked with conducting a presidentially-directed national security mission to defend the United States against the threat of ICBM attack. At Fort Greely, Alaska, the Alaska Army National Guard AGR Solders of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion are charged with the same ballistic missile defense mission as the 100th but have the additional mission essential task for their Military Police to secure the Missile Defense Complex at Fort Greely. The small contingent of California Army National Guard Soldiers of 100th MDB Detachment 1 at Vandenberg AFB are tasked with performing liaison and asset management of the GBIs located there in support of the brigade and battalion. In order to perform their federal mission, all 100th MDB National Guard Soldiers ope-rate in a “dual status” allowing them to automatically transition between Title 10 fede-ral Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard status. The Soldiers seamlessly transition between these two statuses depending on the duties they are performing or location. When on-duty at GMD operational sites performing their federal mission they serve in Title 10 and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. When off-duty or in an administrative status away from GMD operational sites they are in a Title 32 status and are administratively controlled ADCON to their respective States’ National Guard.Digital Phase Shift Control for Phased Array Radar Invention by Harvey G. Cragon and Henry N. PetersonThis invention relates to control of a radar involving microwave modular an-tenna, and more particularly to digital phase shift control of a multielement phased array antenna. This invention is particularly advantageous in connection with the construction and operation of airborne radar, but also has important application in ground based and ship based systems.Thule Phased Array Radar Greenland Areas of application include radars used for ground mapping, search and detection, fire control, tracking, navigation, terrain following, and terrain avoidance. With this invention, the radar may be operated in any one of the above modes or in several of such modes on a time-sharing basis. Airborne radar systems inherently have a problem of generating high power microwave energy and processing the transmitted and received signals while maintaining high reliability and minimum weight. Major reliability problems in radars have been concerned with components such as rotary joints, servomotors for the antennas, and the like. Restrictions imposed by such components on reliability exist in the most contemporary transistorized radars. Further, the use of magnetrons for transmitting, klystrons for local oscillator service, and use of high power transmit-receive TR protection devices, all have been found to restrict the reliability of the system. The present invention is directed to an improved radar which may employ solid-state circuitry so constructed that major obstacles heretofore encountered in the development of solid-state radar may be overcome. A solidstate functional electronic module has been developed for construction of a modular antenna array responsive to beam steering control disclosed in application Ser. No. 397,491 of Harry E. Cooke, et al., filed Sept. 18, 1964, now abandoned in favor of continuation application. The Principle of Digital Phase shift 1. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a line of elements in a phased antenna which comprises:a separate selectively variable delay means in each of said elements through which radar signals must pass,b a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of elements in said line,c a source of clock pulses,d means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time gate proportional to the desired radiation angle of said line of elements,e separate counter and switch means for control of each of said delay means,f circuit means for transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first counter to said separate counter means with correspondence between the locations of elements in said line and the positions of outputs of said first counter, andg ‘means operative following application of said clock pulses to said first counter for actuating said switch means to vary the effective lengths of said delay means in dependence upon the counts in their respective separate counters preparatory to transmission of signals through said elements.2. The combination set forth in claim 1 in which said first counter is a binary rate counter.3. The system of claim 1 wherein modulo-360 generators are included in each output of said first counter.4. The system of claim 3 wherein each modulo-360 generator includes means to introduce a present count therein with selected reset pulses applied thereto.5. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a two-dimensional multimodule antenna which comprises:’a separate selectively variable delay means within each said module through which radar signals must pass,b a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in one dimension of said antenna,0 a second counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in a second dimension of said antenna,d a source of clock pulses,e means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time interval proportional to the desired azimuth angle,f means for applying said clock pulses to said second counter during a time interval proportional to the desired elevation angle,g separate switching counters and switch means for each of said delay means,h circuit means for sequentially transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first and second counters to said switching counters with correspondence between the locations of the modules in said antenna and the positions of the outputs of said first and second counters to actuate said switch means to vary the electrical lengths of said delay means in dependence upon the count in their respective counters preparatory to transmission of radar signals therethrough.6. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a two-dimensional multimodule antenna which comprises:a separate selectively variable delay means within each said module through which radar signals must pass,b a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in one dimension of said antenna,c a second counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in a second dimension of said antenna,d a source of clock pulses,e means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time interval proportional to the desired azimuth angle,f means for applying said clock pulses to said second counter during a time interval proportional to the desired elevation angle,g separate switching counters and switch means for each of said delay means,h circuit means for transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first and second counters to said switching counters with correspondence between the locations of the modules in said antenna and the positions of the outputs of said first and second counters, andi means operative following application of said clock pulses to said first and second counters to actuate said switch means to vary the electrical lengths of 13 said delay means in dependence upon the count in their respective counters preparatory to transmission of radar signals therethrough.7. The method of dynamically controlling the directional character of a two dimensional phased array antenna which comprises:a generating a first train of clock impulses of length proportional to the desired azimuth angle,b generating a second train of clock pulses of length proportional to the desired elevation angle, from said first train, producing a first set of secondary trains of pulses in number corresponding with the number of elements arrayed along one dimension of said antenna and with the trains of said first set grated in length in dependence upon locations of said elements across said antenna,d from said second train producing second set of secondary trains of pulses in number corresponding with the number of elements arrayed along a second dimension of said antenna with the trains of said second set graded in length in dependence upon location of said elements across said antenna, ande adjusting the electrical length of the radar path leading to each element in response to the sum of pulses in pairs of different trains of said secondary pulses where one train of each pair is derived from said first set and the other from said second set.8. The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second trains of pulses are produced simultaneously and wherein said first and second sets are employed sequentially.9. The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second sets of pulses are each connected to modulo- 360 and are thereafter sequentially applied to each said element.10. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of at line of elements in a phased antenna which comprises:a separate selectively variable delay means in each of said elements through which radar signals must pass,b means for varying the effective lengths of said delay means,c a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of elements in said line,d a source of clock pulses,e means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time gate proportional to the desired radiation angle of said line of elements, andf circuit means for transmitting pulses from the output of said counter to said means for varying with correspondence between the locations of elements in said line and the positions of outputs of said counter to vary the eliective lengths of said delay means.Block DiagramsFIGURE 1 diagrammatically illustrates the operation of an aircraft, its antenna array, and the functional electronic block employed to make up the array;FIGURE 2 illustrates one form of a solid-state antenna module;FIGURE 3 is a block diagram of the multimode radar of FIGURE 1 in which the present invention is employed;FIGURE 4 illustrates a phase shift unit which is incorporated in and used with each module of the” antenna;FIGURE 5 illustrates a phase shift pulse converter employed for the control of the several phase shift elements;FIGURE 6 is a circuit diagram of a binary rate multiplier forming a part of FIGURE 5;FIGURE 7 is a line selector and quantizer employed in the system of FIGURE 5;FIGURE 8 illustrates a preferred embodiment of the invention, taken with FIGURES 9 and 10;FIGURE 9 is a detailed circuit diagram of a portion of the system of FIGURE 8; andFIGURE 10 illustrates time relationships in FIGURES 8 and 9. KWAJALEIN ATOLL REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDSConstruction is underway on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to build Space Fence, a sophisticated system that will dramatically improve the way the U.S. Air Force identifies and tracks objects in space. The new system’s initial operational capability is scheduled for 2018.Click and PlayBelow is an aerial view of the U.S. Air Fence under construction on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Island. The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the survellance fence. Pic: Lockheed Martin.Click and PlayWith critical design review completed, the Space Fence team is focused on production of technology that will bring the system online. Space Fence will use Gallium Nitride GaN powered S-band ground-based radars to provide the Air Force with uncued detection, tracking and accurate measurement of space objects, primarily in low-earth orbit. Lockheed Martin engineers and U.S. Air Force personnel are testing and training on a scaled-down version of the system in Moorestown NJ known as the Integration test Bed. The ITB provides the operational context to integrate and test end-item hardware and software prior to installation in the new Space Fence facility on Kwajalein.The locations and higher wave frequency of the new Space Fence radars will permit the detection of much smaller microsatellites and debris than current systems. Additionally, Lockheed Martin’s Space Fence design will significantly improve the timeliness with which operators can detect space events, which could present potential threats to GPS satellites or the International Space Station. The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the surveillance fence. Kwajalein atoll Peacekeeper missile testing. THE ALTAIR RADAR THE KWAJALEIN ATOLLBelow, four SSN radars at Kwajalein. The ALTAIR antenna is the large dish at upper center, viewed partially against the lagoon. The antenna for TRADEX, which backs up ALTAIR in the Space Surveillance Network SSN, is the dish antenna on top of the build-ing near the center of the picture. The antenna for the ALCOR imaging radar is in the dome at lower left, and the antenna for the MMW imaging radar is in the dome in the center of the picture be-tween the ALTAIR and TRADEX antennas. THE TRADEX ALTAIR RADARS ON THE KWAJALEIN ATOLL Click and PlayEGLIN Air Force BaseTHE FPS-85 EGLIN RADARThe FPS-85 has been described as the workhorse of the SSN, and is the largest, most sensitive and most important for space surveillance purposes of the SSN’s LPARs. It is one of the three dedicated radar sensors in the SSN the others are the Air Force Fence and the GLOBUS II dish antenna radar in Norway. The radar is located in Eglin, Florida and thus sometimes referred to as the Eglin Radar at about 30.6° N 30.57N, 86.22 E and points directly south. The FPS-85 was the world’s first large phased-array radar. Its construction began in 1962, but it was destroyed by fire in 1965 before becoming fully operational. It was rebuilt and began operations in 1969. The radar was originally intended only for space surveillance, but in 1975 it was also assigned a submarine-launched ballistic missile warning mission. In 1987, corre- sponding to the activation of two south-facing PAVE PAWS early warning radars in Georgia and Texas both since deactivated, it returned to full-time space surveillance. The FPS-85 has separate receive and transmit antennas contained within the same building, with boresites pointing due south at a 45º elevations. It can scan ±60˚ in azimuth and from the horizon to 15˚ beyond zenith in elevation. It was built with two separate antennas because at the time of its construction it was less costly to do this than building a single transmit/receive antenna. This choice also facilitated simultaneously obtaining multiple narrow receive beams for more precise tracking and a broader transmit beam more suitable for surveillance.Technical CharacteristicsThe transmitter is a 72×72 rectangular array, with 5,184 transmit modules with 0.55 λ spacing. Its center frequency is 442 MHz, with a 10 MHz bandwidth. Its wavelength is thus about 0.68 m, and the antenna’s diameter is about 26.9 m with an area of 724 m2. The transmit antenna is uniformly illuminated and has a 1.4 degree beam width for comparison, λ/D = 0.68/27 = 1.44 degrees. Each of the 5,184 transmitter element is rated for a peak power of 10 kW and a 0.5% duty cycle. These give an array peak power of 52 MW and an average power of 260 kW. However, according to a 1994 paper the average power of individual elements individual elements varied from 2.5 to 10 W, with an average of about 6 W. This is consistent with a number of sources that give the radar’s peak power as about 30-35 MW. Assuming a peak power of 35 MW, the radar’s average power would then be about 175 kW. The receive antenna is a tapered array with a diameter of 58 m containing 19,500 crossed dipole elements on a square grid, forming a circular aperture 152 elements in diameter. There are 4660 active receive modules. Its receive beam width is 0.8º in comparison, 0.68/58 = 0.0117 = 0.67 degrees. It receives using a 3×3 cluster of receive beams, with a 0.4º spacing, giving a 1 db crossover and thus a low beam-shape loss. The combined beam width is therefore 0.4+0.8+0.4 = 1.6º. All nine receive beams are used in search, but only five in track. The FPS-85 operates in time blocks called resource periods, each of which is 50 ms long. During a resource period, the radar can transmit up to eight pulses for a maximum total transmit time of 250 μs corresponding to duty cycle of 0.5%. Pulse lengths are 1, 5, 10, 25, 125, and 250 μs. Its maximum bandwidth is 10 MHz. The pulse compression used to obtain greater better range resolution ratio may be as large as 1,600. In its long-range surveillance mode, it emits a single 250 μs frequency-modulated compressed pulse every 50 ms. OperationsThe FPS-85 initially conducted surveillance using several different radar fences. A 1994 software upgrade left the FPS-85 with only relatively low-elevation radar fences, as the software needed for a higher-elevation fence intended for detecting lower RCS space objects was not funded. Figure 1 below shows a fence described as the existing SPACETRACK fence in a 1996 paper. This fence begins at an azimuth of 142˚ at an elevation of 15˚, reaches an elevation of 23˚ at 180˚ degrees azimuth along the boresite direction and continues on to an azimuth of 218˚ at an elevation angle of 15˚. This total azimuth extent of 76˚ used 76 beam positions. An additional 24 beam positions were used to extend coverage directly down to an elevation angle of 3˚ at each end of the fence. A 2004 report describes a previously existing fence, the S-1 fence, as scanning between the same endpoints, but reaching a maximum elevation angle of 25˚, as shown in figure 2 below. Another source describes a low-elevation fence which was not leak-proof for all altitudes and elevations with a peak elevation of about 23˚ extending 120˚ in azimuth, dipping down to the horizon at its ends. In 1999, the radar’s software was upgraded to provide a higher-elevation fence. This new “debris” fence was scanned at a maximum of about 35˚ in elevation and ±25˚ degrees in azi-muth from the radar’s due south azimuth boresite. Following tests May 2000, this new debris fence was apparently put into operation, although at the time it was expected that it would be operated in a “background” mode, that is, only when time was left over from its normal space surveillance tasks. However, another source indicates that the FPS-85 was using a 35˚ elevation fence with a length of ±40* for detecting low-earth orbit objects as early as 1997. By integrating large numbers of pulses, the FPS-85 is capable of tracking previously detected objects at least out to geosynchronous orbit range. It is the only phased-array radar in the U.S. Space Surveillance Network capable of tracking objects in geosynchronous orbit the next two largest phased arrays are not oriented so as to be able to view geosynchronous orbit. The FPS-85 assumed a deep space role in November 1988 after receiving a range-extension upgrade enabling integration of many pulses. PHASED ARRAY RADARA THEORETICAL MODEL OF INSTANT DETECTION AND RESPONSE SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND SAND DIEGOU.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMANDTHE MILLSTONE HILL RADAR MASSACHUSETTS, USAThe Space Surveillance Network SSN is made up of sensors, communications links, proces sing centers, and data distribution channels. The sensors are a conglomeration of capabil- ities mostly derived from and shared by other missions. Few of the sensors were developed for the express purpose of conducting space surveillance. The Air Force has recognized that providing warfighters with effective Space Situational Awareness SSA requires a coordi-nated architecture-based approach to establishing and maintaining sensor capabilities. Air Force Space Command AFSPC has established pro-grams to acquire new capabilities such asSpace Based Space Surveillance SBSS and Space Fence, has partnered with other agen-cies to acquire the first Space Surveillance Telescope SST, and has begun to modernize legacy capabilities such as the Eglin FPS-85 radar, the Haystack radar, the GLOBUS II radar, and the Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance GEODSS system. The Air Force has also recognized that protection of space systems must become a priority, and has established a program to do this through Self Awareness Space Situational Awareness SASSA. Space Based Space Surveillance The first SBSS satellite is expected to launch into a sun-synchronous low-Earth orbit in October 2009. The satellite was built by a team made up of Boeing prime and Ball Aerospace space vehicle. The development and production contract provides for satellite design, fabrication, delivery, and launch, as well as ground station delivery and post-launch support. Launch will be on a Minotaur IV from Vandenberg AFB. INCHOHRENT SCATTERING RADARSSPACE BASED SPACE SURVEILLANCE The satellite is ready for launch. The mission of SBSS is timely detection, identification, and tracking of resident space objects RSOs. SBSS will track objects primarily in deep space orbital period greater than 225 minutes. However, SBSS will also have the capability to track objects with shorter periods, illumination permitting. SBSS will provide position, man-euver setection, and space object identification data to the Joint Space Operations Center JSpOC and the Alternate Space Control Center ASCC. The SBSS payload consists of a visible sensor assembly, a gimbal, and payload deck electronics. The visible sensor assembly consists of: • Optical bench • Telescope • CCD focal plane array • Cryoradiator • Video Interface Box • Elevation electronics box • Filter wheel mechanism • Focus mechanism • Aperture door mechanism • Electrical harness The gimbal consists of: • Beryllium yoke • Azimuth and elevation drives • Azimuth launch lock • Electrical harness for interface with payload electronics.The payload deck electronics package consists of: • Payload electronics box • Gimbal amplifier segment • Solid state recorder • On-board mission data processor • Electrical harness for interface with visible sensor assembly, gimbal, and bus Space Survei-llance Telescope SST is a ground-based system using the latest in optical technology to in-crease SSA capability.THE SST DARPA PROGRAM The SST program is a DARPA technology demonstration providing a 3.5 meter f/1.0 tele-scope. SST has the potential to become an Air Force Space Command AFSPC dedicated sensor pending successful outcome of a demonstration in 2011- 2012. MIT Lincoln Laboratory is providing program management, integration, supervision of facility construction, and the telescope camera. L-3 Integrated Optical Systems is building the telescope. AUSTRALIANAVAL E. HOLT COMMUNICATON STATIONEXMOUTH WESTERN AUSTRALIAThe telescope achieved first light in February 2011. In 2013, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Australian Minister of Defence signed an MOU agreeing to relocate the Space Surveillance Telescope from the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to Harold E. Holt Naval Communication Station in Western Australia. Australia offers a uniquely beneficial vantage point for operational testing and demonstrat-ion of SST’s enhanced algorithms and camera. After the move, SST will be owned by the United States Air Force, but operated and maintained by Australia. It will be a dedicated sensor in the U.S. Space Surveillance Network SSN. The SST will detect small objects in deep space, and provide a rapid, wide-area search capa-bility, significantly increasing optical surveillance capacity. The tele-scope is designed to find, fix, track, and characterize faint objects. It will be more sensitive than GEODSS. SST will be the first large telescope to employ a curved CCD focal plane array. It is the most dynamically agile telescope of its size ever built. It provides the first major technology push for deep space surveillance in over three decades. The Defence Minister says a new telescope planned for Western Australia will not be used to spy on other countries, even though it will have the capability to do so. The powerful device will be built in Exmouth as part of an agreement between Australia and the United States. It will contribute to the US global Space Surveillance Network, which provides warnings to all satellite operators of potential collisions with other satellites or debris. A US Navy communication station already exists in the town, in West Australia’s north-west.David Johnston, Defense Minister Australia The construction costs of the telescope will be shared and it will be located at the Harold Holt naval communications facility. Defence Minister David Johnston says the telescope will focus on protecting satellites from space junk and will be operating in 2016. “The US indicated they needed some southern hemisphere coverage,” he told AM. “They came to us and we said ‘well, why don’t we put it at Exmouth? “And they said ‘that’s a good idea’. And here we are. Below is transcript of the radio talk with Defense Minister David Johnston. TONY EASTLEY: The small West Australian town of Exmouth will soon be home to a space surveillance telescope, the result of a highly sensitive United States and Australian defence agreement.While the telescope will track asteroids and space debris, the Australian Defence Minister insists it will not be used for spying, despite having the ability to do so.The telescope has been moved to the Harold Holt naval communications facility at Exmouth.Here’s AM’s Caitlyn Gribbin. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: Exmouth, north of Perth, is best known for its US Navy communication station. Now, it’s getting a space surveillance telescope. The Minister for Defence, Senator David Johnston:DAVID JOHNSTON: The US indicated they needed some southern hemisphere coverage. They came to us and we said well why don’t we put it at Exmouth? And they said that’s a good idea. And here we are. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: Senator Johnston and the US secretary of defence Chuck Hagel have signed a memorandum of understanding. The construction costs will be shared and the telescope, which will monitor space debris, will be operating in 2016. Radio astronomy researcher professor Steven Tingay:STEVEN TINGAY: What it does is transmit radio waves out into space. Those radio waves reflect off bits of space junk and the reflected waves are received by the telescope. And the telescope basically tracks the space junk, predicts its orbit and is there to try and help prevent collisions between the space junk and satellites. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: The telescope has the capacity to reach out over 36,000 kilometres. Senator Johnston says it’s in the national interest to build the telescope in WA. DAVID JOHNSTON: We have a very large number of satellites that we use for communication purposes and you’d think it’s really important that we assist the operators of those satellites to be able to steer around this space junk.CAITLYN GRIBBIN: Minister, when surveillance technology is spoken about, so too is its ability to facilitate spying. Do you have any concerns about that? DAVID JOHNSTON: No, I don’t. I’m very much aware that this is for the general use of satellites that are largely civil in their output. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: Does the memorandum of understanding that you’ve signed with the US have a clause specifying that the telescope won’t be used for spying purposes? DAVID JOHNSTON: I’m, I don’t have the document in front of me. It was a very short document. It was about the surveillance of space debris. It doesn’t look at Earth. It looks out from Earth into the outer atmosphere so that it’s, you know, it’s focused on things that are in the line of travel of satellites. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: Professor Tingay again: STEVEN TINGAY: Obviously surveillance of all different types can use radar techniques and listening techniques. So broadly speaking, it’s in the same class of instruments but its specific purpose is to do radar for space junk. CAITLYN GRIBBIN: The telescope will contribute to the US global Space Surveillance Network, which provides warnings to all satellite operators of potential collisions with other satellites or debris. WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE NEW MEXICO, USAThe SST facility at White Sands Missile Range NM is complete. The telescope is still under construction. SST will see first light in late 2010. DARPA testing will occur in 2010 and 2011. AFSPC will evaluate the telescope’s performance in actual operations in 2011 and 2012. During this evaluation period, SST will operate as a contributing sensor to the SSN. At the end of the evaluation period, assuming SST performance is acceptable, it will become a dedicated SSN sensor.The potential exists to acquire and deploy additional SST installations in the post-2012 time frame. AFSPC will publish an architecture that includes SSTs in late 2009. Eglin FPS-85 Radar Service Life Extension Pro-gram SLEP The FPS-85 is the work-horse of the SSN in the near-Earth regime. It provides timely and accurate metric tracking and space object identification data. Although primarily a near-Earth sensor, it is the only dedicated, high-capacity phased array radar with both near-Earth and deep-space capability. It is the primary tracker of low-inclination objects, and of objects that transit the manned-spaceflight regime. It has the capability to track most near-Earth objects once per day. View of the solar array, the U.S. Army’s largest solar photovoltaic system, located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, USA. GEODSS SLEP GEODSS GEODSS SLEP GEODSS is the key provider of deep space metric observations. It produces 70% of all geosynchronous tracks and 50% of all deep space tracks. GEODSS tracks over 200 objects not tracked by any other sensor. The GEODSS SLEP funds replacement of aged and unsustainable Sensor Controller Group and Data Processing Group with modern compo-nents. Without the SLEP, GEODSS will soon experience degraded operations, and eventual mission failure.Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System on Diego Garcia The FPS-85 routinely tracks 50-60 manned spaceflight objects that are not tracked by any other sensor, and 220-230 manned spaceflight objects that are tracked by at most one other sensor. This makes the operation of the FPS-85 critical to the safety of manned space-flight. The SLEP will extend the operation of the radar until 2018 and will provide the ground work for future updates to the radar. The SLEP will replace: • Computer • Radar Interface and Control Equipment • Calibration system • Signal processor • Beam steering equipment Haystack Ultra-Wideband Satellite Imaging Radar HUSIR The Haystack radar is a contribut-ing sensor operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and provides imaging of nearEarth and deep space objects. Haystack operates today at X-band, with one GHz of bandwidth. The upgrade will add the capability to operate at W-band with eight MHz of bandwidth. This will enable finer characterization of satellites, and characterization of smaller satellites than possible today. Operation at W-band requires replacement of the current Haystack antenna. Because of this, Haystack will be down from operations from May 2010 until August 2011. A smaller antenna, which is being used to test the W-band RF components, is producing images and will be available for limited operations during this time. Space Fence The Space Fence program is a new acquisition that will produce three world-wide-dispersed radar sites. The radars will provide the ability to perform un-cued tracking of small objects at low and medium orbital altitudes. The Space Fence program was begun by the US Navy to replace the current VHF Fence radar system. In 2003, the Navy transferred the program to the Air Force. In the intervening years, the Air Force has refined the require-ments for the program to make the resulting radars more capable than a simple VHF Fence replacement. The program is in concept development, with an expected IOC for the first site of 2015. GLOBUS II SLEP The GLOBUS II radar is a dedicated sensor that provides metric tracking and imaging of near-Earth and deep space satellites. It provides the only all-weather, 24/7 space track capability covering 0-90 degrees east longitude. The radar is located in Vardo Norway. It is one of five wide-band imaging radars in the SSN. It provides the most accurate tracking of any space surveillance radar. Radar development began in 1992. The radar was fielded in Norway in 2003, making it 11 years old at IOC. As a result, the radar’s reliability has been deteriorating since it was fielded. Extended down-times for emergency maintenance are expected in the 2010 time frame. AFSPC will begin a SLEP in 2010 to extend the service life of the radar to 2030. SASSA IISelf-Awareness Space Situational Awareness SASSA US space systems are increasingly su-sceptible to a wide variety of threats. The US needs to provide effective protection for space systems. The first step in doing this is to provide effective tactical and strategic situ-ational awareness. The SASSA program will support this first step by providing a com-mon, stand-ards-based solution. This is the most effective and efficient way to integrate a variety of sen-sors and other instruments on a broad set of satellites. SASSA will begin with a tech-nical demonstration and will proceed with methodical risk re-duction activities over the subsequent several years. SASSA I will be a prototype and techni-cal demonstration activity going through the 2013 time frame. It will produce an integrated set of flight hardware that will be operated on-orbit, providing a test bed to allow continued interface testing with new instruments. The interface specification will be developed to enable future technology investments. Lessons learned will be integrated into SASSA II. SASSA I characteristics are: • A two-year development, followed by a one year on orbit demonstration on an operational host • A common interface unit that can handle six instruments such as radar warning receivers • Low technical risk in components • Moderate technical risk in software and interfaces • Define common interface standards for instruments and bus connections • Leave-behind test bed capability SASSA I is not intended to address the full spectrum of threats. SASSA II will be a risk reduction program in the 2010 – 2015 time frame. It will establish policy for future space protection activities. Instruments and interfaces developed in SASSA I will be matured to provide more effective protection. SASSA will end with a finalized busi-ness strategy to guide future activities. An eventual SASSA acquisition program 2014 and beyond will encompass full-scale production of a standardized protection capability. The goal is integrated on-board awareness and protection capabilities for all US space systems. SPACE SITUATION AWARENESSSpace Situational Awareness SSA is knowledge of all aspects of space related to ope-rations. As the foundation for space control, SSA encompasses intelligence on adversary space operations; surveillance of all space objects and activities; detailed reconnais-sance of specific space assets; monitoring space environmental conditions; monitoring cooperative space assets; and conducting integrated command, control, communications, processing, analysis, dissemination, and archiving activities. Program Element 0305940F, Space Situational Awareness Operations, fields, upgrades, operates and maintains Air Force sensors and information integration capabilities within the SSA network while companion program element 0604425F, Space Situation Awareness Systems, develops new network sensors and improved information integration capabilities across the network. Activities funded in the SSA Operations program element focus on surveillance of objects in earth orbit to aid tasks including satellite tracking; space object identification; tracking and cataloging; satellite attack warning; notification of satellite flyovers to U.S. Forces; space treaty monitoring; and technical intelligence gathering. The Sensor Service Life Extension Programs SLEPsin this program element fund efforts to upgrade and extend the life of operational Space Situation Awareness SSA sensors, as needed. These SLEPs include, but are not limited to, programs that extend the serviceable life of assets and maintain critical capability by replacing aging and increasingly unsustain- able components with modern equipment. SLEPs may incorporate equipment which inher-ently includes technological advances resulting in enhanced or increased capabilities. In addition, the SLEP itself may be designed to increase certain capabilities. The current efforts of Eglin, Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar HUSIR, Ground-based Electro Optical Deep Space Surveillance GEODSS, and Globus III are representative of sensor systems upgraded in the SLEP project. As the need arises in the execution year, funds in this project may be used to begin sensor life extension programs on additional efforts. These efforts are in Budget Activity 7, Operational System Development, because they develop modifications for operational SSA sensors.Originally known as HAVE STARE AN/FPS-129, the radar became operational in 1995 at Vandenberg Air Force base in California. While there, it observed several intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM flight tests a as well as two non-intercept tests of the kill vehicle for U.S. National missile defense interceptor then under development IFT-1A and IFT-2. Beginning in late 1998, HAVE STARE was dismantled and moved to Vardo, and renamed Globus II and appears to have become operational in about 2003. A radar named Globus, had been operated since the 1960s by Norway at Vardo, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, and was used to monitor Soviet and Russian ballistic missile flight tests. Outside observers have argued that Globus II is likely to be used to gather information on Russian ballistic missile tests, and that such information could be useful for ballistic missile defense. However, official Norwegian government statements stated that the radar would be used operated by only Norwegian personnel and would be used to track and monitor objects, including space debris in space, research and development, and “Surveillance of the Norwegian area of interest, including the technical gathering of intelligence.” RUSSIAN DEFENSESTRATEGIC LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADSIn January 2017 Russia was estimated to have 528 strategic launchers and about 1800 nuclear warheads. In its March 2017 New START data exchange Russia reported 523 deployed launchers with 1765 New START-accountable nuclear warheads. STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCESThe Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to have 286 operational missile systems that include missiles that can carry 958 warheads. These include 46 R-36M2, SS-18 missiles, 30 UR-100NUTTH SS-19 missiles, 36 road-mobile Topol, SS-25 systems, 60 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M, SS-27 systems, and 96 RS-24 missiles. STRATEGIC AVIATIONThe Russian strategic aviation consists of 66 bombers that carry an estimated 200 longrange cruise missiles and bombs. The bombers are 11 Tu-160, Blackjack and 55 Tu-95MS, Bear H. The bombers can carry various modifications of the Kh-55, AS-15 and Kh-101 cruise mis-siles and gravity bombs. Russia operates two satellites of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS, and a network of early-warning radars. STRATEGIC FLEETThe Russian strategic fleet includes 12 operational strategic missile submarines with SLBMs, whose missiles can carry 176 missiles with 752 nuclear warheads. Five operational Project 667BDRM submarines are based in the Northern Fleet. These submarines carry 80 R-29RM, SS-N-23 launchers. One Project 955 submarine with 16 Bulava SLBMs on board is also bas-ed in the Northern Fleet. The only remaining Pacific Fleet base hosts three 667BDR Delta III submarines, which carry 48 R-29R, SS-N-18 missiles and two Project 955 submarines with 32 Bulava SLBMs. RUSSIAN INSTANT-warning systemSThe system that are traditionally considered part of the strategic missile defense, the early-warning system, space surveillance and anti-satellite systems are currently included in the Air and Space Defense Forces, a separate branch of Russia’s Armed Forces, subordi-nated directly to the General Staff. INSTANT-WARNING SATELLITESIn November 2015 Russia launched the first satellite of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS. The satellite, Cosmos-2510, is currently undergoing tests. Second spacecraft, Cosmos-2518, was launched in May 2017. The early-warning satellites were transmitting information in real time to the Western command centers at Serpukhov-15, near Kurilovo, Kaluga oblast and Eastern center near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The information is processed there and transmitted to the command center in Solnechnogorsk.RADARSClick and PlayRussia’s Modern Weapon Rearmament Program: The 21st Century Insurance Policy The Daryal radar in Pechora As of 2017, the land-based component of the instant-warning system included the following radar systems:Radar stationRadarsStatusOlenegorsk RO-1Dnepr/Daugavaoperational Voronezh-VPunder constructionPechora RO-30DaryaloperationalVorkutaVoronezh-VP, -DMunder constructionMishelevka OS-1Dneproperational 2xVoronezh-VPoperationalLekhtusiVoronezh-MoperationalArmavir2xVoronezh-DMoperationalKaliningradVoronezh-DMoperationalBarnaulVoronezh-DMinitial operationsYeniseyskVoronezh-DMinitial operationsOrskVoronezh-Minitial operationsBalkhash, Kazakhstan OS-2DneproperationalBaranovichi, BelarusVolgaoperational In addition to the dedicated early-warning radars, the Don-2N radar of the Moscow missile defense system and the Dunay-3U radar near Chekhov are also used for early-warning and space surveillance. MISSILE DEFENSEThe Moscow missile defense system A-135 is operated by a missile defense division. The main command center of the system and the battle-management radar are located in Sofri-no Moscow oblast. The command center of the system and its radar are undergoing a soft- ware upgrade. The system includes the Don-2N battle-management phased-array radar, command center, and 68 short-range interceptors of the 53T6 Gazelle type. The 32 long-range 51T6 Gorgon interceptors have been removed from the system. The short-range interceptors are deployed at five sites — Lytkarino 16 interceptors, Sofrino 12, Korolev 12 Skhodnya 16, and Vnukovo 12. Long-range missiles used to be deployed with two units with headquart-ers in Naro-Fominsk-10 and Sergiyev Posad-15. The system was accepted for service in 1995.Space surveillanceSpace surveillance system is operated by the Main space-surveillance command center. To monitor objects on low earth orbits and determines parameters of their orbits, the system uses the the early-warning radar network. The space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars. Another system of this type is being deployed near Nakhodka on the Far East. To monitor objects on high-altitude orbits, the space-surveillance system uses optical obser-vations. The main optical observation station, Okno, is located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Its tele-scopes allow detection of object at altitudes of up to 40,000 km. The station began operat-ions in 1999. Space-surveillance tasks are also assigned to observatories of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences.NO GAPS IN RUSSIAN INSTANT-WARNING COVERAGEAccording to the Russian defense minister, three new instant-warning radars will begin com-bat operations in 2017 – Orsk, Barnaul, and Yeniseisk. In addition, three radars–Baranovichi, Murmansk, and Pechora–have been “upgraded.” The radar in Orsk is of the Voronezh-M type. Barnaul and Yeniseisk are Voronezh-DM. The radar in Baranovichi which is in Belarus is an old one-of-a-kind Volga radar. The Daryal radar in Pechora is even older – it’s one of the two original Daryal radars built in the 1970s. It will be eventually replaced by the new radar in Vorkuta, it appears that two radars are being built there, Voronezh-SM/77Ya-SM/77Я6-СМ and Voronezh-VP/77Ya-VP/77Я6-ВП. The Murmansk radar is the old Dnepr/Daugava pair in Olenegorsk. Construction of new radar, probably of the Voronezh-VP kind, began there earlier this year. As we can see, the upgrade of the early-warning radar network has been a very successful program. The space segment of the early-warning system, in contrast, appears to be behind the schedule. The old US-KS/US-KMO system ended operations in 2014. The first and only satellite of the new EKS system, Tundra, was launched in November 2015. It appears to be undergoing tests.The new armament program calls for deployment of ten satellites of the EKS system by 2020, but this plan does not seem particularly realistic. It should be noted, however, that for Russia the space-based segment of the early-warning system is not as as critical as for the United States, since it could never really rely on the “dual phenomenology” approach adopted by the United States. This is illustrated on this figure: It shows that in some scenarios SLBMs launched from the Atlantic, satellites don’t add much to the warning time. In any event, since Russia doesn’t have forward-deployed radars, the radar warning comes to late to provide a useful check of the satellite informa-tion. To deal with the situation, the Soviet Union developed a different mechanism that allowed it to wait for signs of the actual attack such as nuclear explosions before launching its missiles. The arrangement is often referred to as the Dead Hand, since it does involve a certain predelegation of authority as well as the mechanism that ensures that decapitation does not prevent retaliation. The system, however, is not automatic that idea was nixed in the 1980s and requires humans to be involved in the decision to launch. DON-2N IN PUSHKINOThe Don-2N radar is a large missile defence and early warning passive electronically scan- ned array radar outside Moscow, and a key part of the Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system designed for the defence of the capital against ballistic missiles. Located in the Push- kino district of Moscow it is a quadrangular truncated pyramid 33 metres 108 ft tall with sides 130 metres 427 ft long at the bottom, and 90 metres 295 ft long at the top. Each of its four faces has an 18 metres 59 ft diameter Ultra high frequency band radar giving 360 degree coverage. The system is run by an Elbrus-2 supercomputer. It has a range of 3700 km for targets the size of a typical ICBM warhead.Click and PlayVORONEZH-M IN KALININGRAD Voronezh radars are the current generation of Russian early-warning radar, providing long distance monitoring of airspace against ballistic missile attack and aircraft monitoring. The first radar, in Lekhtusi near St Petersburg, became operational in 2009. There is a plan to replace older radars with the Voronezh by 2020. The Voronezh radars are described as highly prefabricated meaning that they have a set up time of months rather than years and need fewer personnel than previous generations. They are also modular so that a radar can be brought into partial operation whilst being incomplete.Russia has used the launch of these new radars to raise its concerns about US missile defence in Europe. At the launch of the Kaliningrad radar in November 2011 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying “I expect that this step [the launch of the radar] will be seen by our partners as the first signal of our country’s readiness to make an adequate response to the threats which the missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces.”THE NUCLEAR TRIAD Excerpts from DOD Directive – DoDD 3150.02, April 24, 2013A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three components: intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs.traditionally strategic bombers B-52 Stratofortress, B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit The purpose of having a three-branched nuclear capability is to significantly reduce the pos-sibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation’s nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation’s nuclear deterrence.U.S. Marines training in Okinawa Japan The Department of Defence PolicyThe President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is the sole au-thority for the employment of U.S. Nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. Assured nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance. Nuclear command and control safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S-5210.81 EnclosuresDIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES DIRNSA/CHCSS.Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelli-gence, the DIRNSA/CHCSS provides information assurance products and services for those systems used to transmit, process, store, or display in-formation related to the control and authorized use of nuclear weapons in accordance with DoD 8500.01 REF: DoDD 3150.02, April 24, 2013 Trident II, black re-entry vehicles containing the warheads on the D5 sub-launched missileThe National Security Agency NSA is a cryptologic intelligence agency of the United States Department of Defense responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign communi-cations and foreign signals intelligence, as well as protecting U.S. Government communi-cations and information systems, which involves information security and cryptanalysis and cryptography.The NSA is directed by at least a lieutenant general or vice admiral. NSA is a key com-ponent of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a co-located agency created to co-ordinate intelligence activities and co-operation between NSA and other U.S. Military cryptanalysis agencies. The Director of the National Security Agency serves as the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and Chief of the Central Security Service. By law, NSA’s intelligence gathering is limited to foreign communications, although domestic incidents such as the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy have occurred. The National Security Agency is divided into two major missions: the Signals Intelligence Directorate SID, which produces foreign signals intelligence information, and the Information Assur-ance Directorate IAD, which protects U.S. Information systems.The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, also known as the Stealth Bomber, is an American heavy penetration strategic bomber, featuring low observable stealth technology. U.S. INTERCEPTORSThe European Phased Adaptive Approach EPAA is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. Assets, personnel and allies in Europe. It is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. According to the Obama administration, the new plan uses technology that is both “proven” and “costeffec-tive,” and will be able to adapt as threats evolve. This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defen-se system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska. This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.Phase 1, DeployedMissile Platforms and NumbersIn March 2011, the USS Monterey was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. This represented “the first sustained deployment of a ballistic missile defense-capable ship” in support of the European PAA.In fiscal year FY 2012, 113 SM-3 Block IA and 16 SM-3 Block IB interceptors will be delivered and 29 Aegis-equipped BMD ships deployed.The SM-3 IA succesfully intercepted a medium-range ballist missile target in its most recent test on February 13, 2013.SM-3 Variant and NumbersSM-3 Block IA interceptors have a velocity of 3 km/second and are designed to engage short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the mid-course phase.Block IA has a single color seeker, a 21 inch-diameter booster, and is 13.5 inches in diameter along the rest of the interceptor.Block IA costs between 9 and 10 million per unit.Some SM-2 Block IVs the SM-3 predecessor will also be retained for use against missiles in the terminal phase.Sensors and Combat SystemInitially, the system will use sea-based sensors mounted on the Aegis ships, as well as a forward-based mobile X-band radar on land. The first EPAA radar was deployed in Turkey in late 2011.The mobile X-band radar is the AN/TPY-2 manufactured by Raytheon. The U.S. Is planning to deploy a total of 18 AN/TPY-2 radars. So far, seven have been produced, and two are currently deployed in Israel and Japan.The sensors and interceptors will be brought together under the Aegis combat system. This is a system capable of tracking 100 simultaneous targets. Phase 1 will primarily use Aegis version 3.6.1 software.According to the Defense Science Board 2011, the current Aegis shipboard radar is inadequate to support the EPAA mission, and the future Navy ship-based Air and Missile Defense Radar AMDR is needed.U.S. And European BMD systems are integrated for battle management at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.Phase 2, Planned Deployment Date: 2015 Missile Platforms and NumbersPhase 2 will see interceptors taken onto land in the first “Aegis-Ashore” deployment in Romania. Interceptors will also be mounted on an increasing number of Aegis BMD ships.In FY2015-2017, the U.S. Navy plans to have 32 Aegis BMD ships.The first “Aegis-Ashore” site in Romania will be equipped with one land-based Aegis SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 missiles.SM-3 Variant and NumbersPhase 2 will include the SM-3 Block IB variant, also with a velocity of 3 km/sec. This interceptor differs from the Block IA in its “seeker” technology, consisting of a two color seeker, or “kill warhead,” and improved optics.100 Block IB interceptors would be purchased by this point, to be deployed along with 139 of the Block IA variant.The Block IB is estimated to cost between 12 and 15 million per unit.Sensors and Combat Systems In Phase 2, sensors will be integrated with updated versions of the Aegis combat system. By FY2015 BMD ships will carry versions 3.6.1, 4.0.1, and 5.0.Phase 3, Planned Deployment Date: 2018 Missile Platforms and NumbersPhase 3 will see the introduction of the second “Aegis-Ashore” site in Poland with another SPY-1 radar and 24 SM-3 missiles. This will supplement the deployments already underway at sea and in Romania and will extend coverage over a greater percentage of Europe.By FY2017, there will be a total of 32 Aegis BMD-capable ships.SM-3 Variant and NumbersPhase 3 will include the SM-3 Block IIA. This new variant will be faster than Block I 4.5 km/sec vs. 3 km/sec., with a 21 inch diameter for the whole length of the missile allowing for more fuel and hence a more powerful motor. This will give the system an “enhanced” capability to address intermediate-range ballistic missiles and a “limited” capability to address intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs. These faster interceptors could potentially increase coverage to the whole European continent.The United States is collaborating with Japan to jointly develop the Block IIA interceptor. The program is scheduled to begin flight testing in 2014.Improved seeker and optics will be included.19 Block IIAs are scheduled to be purchased by this point; they will complement the 390 Block I variants that are planned for FY2017.Sensors and Combat Systems In Phase 3, the United States will deploy both the Precision Tracking Space System PTSS and Airborne Infrared ABIR sensor platforms. Both of these systems are designed to track significantly larger numbers of incoming missiles, with the goal of being able to track “hundreds” of missiles simultaneously.Aegis BMD ships are scheduled to be equipped with version 5.1 of the combat system software in this time-frame.Phase 4, Cancelled March 2013Missile Platforms and NumbersThe platforms supporting the SM-3 interceptors under Phase 4 would have remained the same as those deployed under Phase 3 – sea-based platforms and the “Aegis-Ashore” deployments in Romania and Poland.SM-3 Variant and NumbersThe SM-3 Block IIB; planned numbers unknown. Was planned to have an improved seeker and a higher performance booster, with a velocity of 5-5.5 km/sec. Was expected to marginally improve the Block IIA’s “limited” capability to counter ICBMs.According to the Defense Science Board 2011, the SM-3 IIB’s planned mission to intercept targets prior to the deployment of multiple warheads or penetration aids – known as “early intercept” – requires “Herculean effort and is not realistically achievable, even under the most optimistic set of deployment, sensor capability, and missile technology assumptions.”The Block IIB was in the conceptual stage. Category and DescriptionPresident George W. Bush announced Dec. 17, 2002 that the United States would begin fielding the initial elements of a limited ballistic missile defense system in 2004. As of February 2009, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency MDA reports having deployed 28 ground-based missile interceptors, divided between Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.The United States also possesses 18 warships equipped with Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, a system intended to counter short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles as of January 2009. The U.S. Missile defense system relies on four fixed radar facilities at Shemya, Alaska, Beale Air Force Base, California, Fylingdales in the United Kingdom, and Thule, Greenland. The network also includes four mobile X-band radars, and a sea-based X-band radar SB-X, currently deployed in the Pacific Ocean.Developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses ranked high among the priorities of the George W. Bush administration.. In June 2002, Bush withdrew the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Treaty, which had barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The administration also aggressively sought foreign partners for the U.S. Program and, during Bush’s last year in office, reached deals to deploy missile interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.Still, the technology remains unproven .Intercept tests have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. In thirteen tests, the Pentagon has hit a mock warhead eight times. In the most recent test, conducted on December 5, 2008, the interceptor successfully destroyed the mock warhead; however, the incoming missile failed to deploy countermeasures meant to fool the interceptor into missing its target.Pentagon officials acknowledge that the initial system will be rudimentary. But they argue that some defense is better than none at all. In addition, they assert that the only way to conduct more strenuous and realistic testing of the system is to deploy it..For more than five decades, the United States has intermittently researched and worked on missile defenses. The planned deployment this fall will mark the second time that the United States has moved to deploy a defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The first effort, Safeguard, was shut down within a few months of being declared operational in October 1975 because Congress concluded the defense was too expensive and ineffectual. Under Safeguard, which Washington deployed in a configuration to comply with the ABM Treaty, the United States sought to protect an offensive U.S. Missile base located in North Dakota.The Bush administration inherited seven main missile defense programs, including the ground-based missile interceptor system and two related satellite programs. For the most part, the Bush administration continued work on these same programs, although it recast some, cut others, and added new projects. It canceled one sea-based system—the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System—and significantly down-sized a space-based laser initiative, while commencing new efforts to develop interceptors to attack multiple targets and to strike enemy missiles early in their flights. During the Clinton administration, Republicans repeatedly asserted that the development of working missile defenses was being hindered by a lack of political will, not scientific or engineering challenges. However, several missile defense programs have fallen further behind schedule and suffered setbacks due to technical difficulties under the Bush administration. An aircraft designed to be armed with a powerful laser—known as the Airborne Laser—is now more than two years behind schedule and may be shelved. One of the two inherited satellite programs has been overhauled and renamed, while the other has far exceeded cost and schedule estimates. In addition, the Pentagon’s ground- and sea-based missile interceptors have experienced schedule and testing delays due to problems with their kill vehicles, which are the components intended to seek out and collide with enemy warheads.In general, the Bush administration reorganized missile defense programs, placing all of them under one big tent the Missile Defense Agency rather than working on each one in isolation. And, whereas previous administrations drew a distinction between theater defenses those designed to hit short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and strategic defenses those intended to intercept long-range missiles/ICBMs, the Bush administration did not, claiming to pursue a general research and development program for a layered missile defense comprised of many different types of systems and capabilities. Nevertheless, the Pentagon maintains individual program offices for each system, albeit with an eye toward sharing technology among the systems and exploring how they might operate together. In addition, the Pentagon is actively pushing to expand some of the earlier theater missile defense programs to try and tackle the strategic mission. ICBMs travel farther, faster, and are more likely to employ countermeasures intended to fool defenses than shorter-range missiles. The ABM Treaty permitted the development of theater missile defense systems but prohibited work on nationwide strategic defenses.At this time, only the ground-based interceptor system has been tested against strategic ballistic missile targets, although the Pentagon has started to investigate whether some radars and sensors used in theater systems might also be capable of tracking a strategic ballistic missile. Preliminary findings are encouraging, according to the Pentagon, which has declined to provide specific test results. The Obama administration has expressed general support for the idea of national missile defense, but indicated that some Bush-era programs may be up for review. According the to White House website, the administration “will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.” This sentiment has been echoed by Vice President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.The following chart provides a brief look at each of the Pentagon’s major missile defense programs. It contains information on what type of ballistic missile each defense would be intended to counter and at which stage of the enemy missile’s flight an attempted intercept would take place. Also included are Pentagon estimates on when each defense may have an initial, rudimentary capability as well as when it could be fully operational. Ballistic Missile BasicsBallistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, free-falling trajectory toward the target. They are classified by the maximum distance that they can travel, which is a function of how powerful the missile’s engines rockets are and the weight of the missile’s warhead. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1,000 kilometers approximately 620 milesMedium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,000–3,000 kilometers approximately 620-1,860 milesIntermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,000–5,500 kilometers approximately 1,860-3,410 milesIntercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs, traveling more than 5,500 kilometersShort- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles. The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of nationwide strategic defenses, but permitted development of theater missile defenses.Ballistic missiles have three stages of flight:The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth. Depending on the missile, this stage lasts between three and five minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling relatively slowly, although toward the end of this stage an ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24,000 kilometers per hour. The missile stays in one piece during this stage.The midcourse phase begins after the rockets finish firing and the missile is on a ballistic course toward its target. This is the longest stage of a missile’s flight, lasting up to 20 minutes for ICBMs. During the early part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is descending toward Earth. It is during this stage that the missile’s warhead, as well as any decoys, separate from the delivery vehicle.The terminal phase begins when the missile’s warhead re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere, and it continues until impact or detonation. This stage takes less than a minute for a strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater than 3,200 kilometers per hour.Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may not leave the atmosphere, have separating warheads, or be accompanied by decoys or other countermeasures.Ground-Based Midcourse DefenseReferred to as National Missile Defense by the Clinton administrationProgram & Key ElementsThe key element of the ground-based midcourse defense is a ground-based missile interceptor consisting of a powerful multistage booster and an exoatmospheric kill vehicle EKV, which separates from the booster in space and seeks out its target through radar updates and use of its onboard visual and infrared sensors.The EKV destroys its target by colliding with it. This process is referred to as hit-to-kill.Designed to CounterThe projected system’s goal is to intercept strategic ballistic missile warheads in the midcourse stage.StatusTo date, the system has had eight successful intercept attempts in twelve developmental tests.The most recent test, on Dec. 5, 2008, was successful; however, the target missile failed to deploy counter-measures meant to fool the interceptor into tracking the wrong target.Capability/ScheduleAll the intercept tests to date have involved substitute components in highly scripted scenarios. A C-band transponder on the target provides tracking data used to formulate the system’s initial intercept plan; the target and interceptor fly the same trajectories in every test; the intercepts take place at slower speeds and lower altitudes than what would be expected in a real attack; the interceptor is preprogrammed with information on what the target looks like before the intercept attempt; and the tests do not involve realistic decoys that a potential adversary might use to trick the system into hitting the wrong object. Lt. General Henry Obering, until November 21, 2008, the Director of the MDA, testified before Congress on April 1, 2008 that missile defense tests are “increasing in operational realism.”The Pentagon is currently planning to deploy six missile interceptors, at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four more interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, by early 2005. Another 10 interceptors are to be deployed at FortGreely before the end of 2005.There are no plans to fire interceptors from FortGreely for testing purposes. .The interceptors under the Clinton plan were to have been supported by a land-based X-band radar, but the Bush administration also developed a sea-based X-band radar SBX. There is currently one SBX radar mounted on a mobile modified oil rig in the Pacific Ocean. SBX was used on Dec. 5, 2008, to help provide tracking data to an interceptor during a successful missile defense test.Bush’s plans also called for the missile interceptors to be supported by an upgraded, although less capable, early-warning radar on ShemyaIsland at the western tip of the Aleutian Islands chain. This radar, known as the Cobra Dane radar, is only be able to track missiles fired from the direction of Asia because the radar is fixed to face northwest.MDA is also exploring the construction of a third missile defense site in Europe. The Bush administration signed a deal with Poland on August 20, 2008, to place ten missile interceptors on Polish territory. The Bush administration also won the approval of the Czech government on April 3, 2008, to build a tracking radar facility in the CzechRepublic.The United States is upgrading two foreign-based, early-warning radars to help track ballistic missiles launched from the direction of the Middle East. One radar Fylingdales is located in the United Kingdom and the other is at Thule Air Base in Greenland. Fylingdales has been upgraded and is operational, while the Thule-based radar will be integrated into the missile defense system by the end of fiscal year 2009.Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense BMDReferred to as Navy Theater Wide by the Clinton administrationProgram & Key ElementsThe key elements of the proposed sea-based defense are a ship-based missile Standard Missile- 3, or SM-3 and the Aegis combat system, an advanced system that can detect and track more than 100 targets simultaneously while directing a ship’s weapons to counter incoming air, surface, and submarine threats.The SM-3 is a hit-to-kill missile comprised of a three-stage booster with a kill vehicle.The SM-3 is considered too slow to intercept a strategic ballistic missile.Designed to CounterInitially, the Aegis BMD is geared toward defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase with an emphasis on the ascent stage.The Aegis system is capable of tracking ICBMs, but is not configured to intercept them.A faster SM-3 is being developed that is intended to have some capability to intercept ICBMs. The upgraded SM-3, known as the Block IIA, is not expected until 2015.StatusThe system has a record of fourteen intercepts in eighteen flight tests. The two most recent tests, both in November 2008, were failures. In a November 1 test, two target missiles and two interceptors were launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers in the Pacific Ocean. One interceptor hit its target, but the other did not. In another test, on November 19, 2008, the interceptor lost track of its target seconds before impact.Capability/ScheduleAs of January 2009, the U.S. Navy has eighteen ships outfitted with the Aegis BMD system. Sixteen of these ships are deployed in the Pacific Ocean, leaving two in the Atlantic.Between 2011 and 2021, the Navy hopes to build an Aegis force of 84 ships: 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers.Airborne Laser ABLProgram & Key ElementsThe key element of the proposed ABL system is a modified Boeing 747 plane equipped with a chemical oxygen-iodine laser.The laser beam is produced by a chemical reaction.Designed to CounterAlthough the Pentagon originally aimed to field the ABL against theater ballistic missiles, the Pentagon now contends the ABL may have an inherent capability against strategic ballistic missiles as well.The expanded ABL objective is to shoot down all ranges of ballistic missiles in their boost phase.StatusThe first ABL test plane made its inaugural flight on July 18, 2002. The plane was not equipped with the laser.By 2007, an ABL test plane had successfully tracked a target and hit it with a low-power laser. The target was not a ballistic missile, however, but was mounted on another aircraft.Although Clinton administration plans first projected an ABL intercept attempt to take place in 2003, development delays have led the Pentagon to push back such a test several times. It is now expected to take place in 2009.Capability/ScheduleThe Government Accountability Office estimates that ABL will be operational sometime in 2016-2017.Terminal High Altitude Area Defense THAADProgram & Key ElementsTHAAD’s main components are a missile comprised of a single rocket booster with a separating kill-vehicle that seeks out its target with the help of a specifically designed THAAD radar.The THAAD kill vehicle is hit-to-kill.THAAD missiles are fired from a truck-mounted launcher.Designed to CounterTHAAD’s mission is to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles at the end of their midcourse stage and in the terminal stage. Intercepts could take place inside or outside the atmosphere.StatusThe system had two successful intercept attempts in the summer of 1999 after experiencing six test failures between April 1995 and March 1999.The THAAD missile was redesigned, and testing resumed in July 2006.THAAD has tested successfully five times since being redesigned. In two other tests the interceptor was not launched due to malfunctions of the target missiles.Capability/ScheduleStill in testing and development, however, the first THAAD battery was activated in May 2008.Patriot Advanced Capability-3 PAC-3Program & Key ElementsPAC-3 consists of a one-piece, hit-to-kill missile interceptor fired from a mobile launching station, which can carry 16 PAC-3 missiles.The missile is guided by an independent radar that sends its tracking data to the missile through a mobile engagement control station.Designed to CounterPAC-3 is designed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their terminal stage at lower altitudes than the THAAD system.StatusDuring earlier developmental testing, the system struck nine out of 10 targets.In four, more difficult operational tests between February and May 2002 that involved multiple interceptors and targets, seven PAC-3s were to be fired at five targets. Of the seven PAC-3s, two destroyed their targets, one hit but did not destroy its target, one missed its target, and three others did not launch.PAC-3s destroyed two Iraqi short-range ballistic missiles during the 2003 conflict and shot down a U.S. Fighter jet. Earlier Patriot models also deployed to the region shot down nine Iraqi missiles and a British combat aircraft.Capability/SchedulePAC-3 is now considered operational.As of July 2004, 175 PAC-3 interceptors had been delivered to the Army.Space Tracking and Surveillance System STSSPreviously referred to as Space-Based Infrared System-low SBIRS-lowProgram & Key ElementsSTSS will initially comprise two satellites, but the constellation could expand to as many as 30 satellites.Designed to CounterSTSS satellites are expected to support U.S. Missile defense systems by providing tracking data on missiles during their entire flight.StatusTwo developmental STSS satellites are to be launched in fiscal year 2009. The SBIRS-low program had called for the first launch of a satellite in 2006.Capability/ScheduleThe first next-generation STSS satellite is to be launched in 2011.Two satellites would provide little, if any, operational capability. The Pentagon estimates that at least 18 satellites would need to be deployed to provide coverage of key regions of concern. Worldwide coverage could require up to 30 satellites.Space-Based Infrared System-high SBIRS-highProgram & Key ElementsSBIRS-high will be comprised of four satellites in geosynchronous orbit and sensors on two host satellites in a highly elliptical orbit.Designed to CounterSBIRS-high’s primary objective is to provide early warning of global ballistic missile launches.StatusCurrently there are two SBIRS geosynchronous satellites orbiting the Earth, along with two SBIRS sensors mounted on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit.The program has cost at least 6 billion more than expected, and is several years behind schedule.Capability/ScheduleThe first sensor in highly elliptical orbit—HEO-1—was certified for operations by U.S. Strategic Command in December 2008. The second sensor—HEO-2—is expected to come online in the first quarter of 2009.Kinetic Energy Interceptor KEIProgram & Key ElementsKEI will be comprised of three powerful boosters and a separating kill vehicle. The booster is expected to travel at least six kilometers per second, which is comparable to an ICBM.The kill vehicle will not carry an explosive warhead but is designed to destroy its target through the force of a collision.The Pentagon is developing mobile land- and sea-based versions of KEI, as well as fixed land-based units.Designed to CounterKEI is intended to destroy strategic ballistic missiles during their first minutes of flight when their rocket engines are still burning.StatusOn Dec. 3, 2003, the Pentagon awarded Northrop Grumman a contract worth up to 4.5 billion to develop KEI over eight years.Capability/ScheduleThe first KEI booster flight is planned for 2009.The Pentagon awarded the KEI contract several months after the independent American Physical Society released a study asserting that boost-phase intercepts would be technically possible under very limited circumstances.System TestsGeneral InformationIn April 2011, the United States conducted its first successful SM-3 test against an intermediate range ballistic missile IRBM. The test involved a Block IA missile and an AN/TPY-2 radar. The test was also the first to use remote tracking data; the radar used to track the target was forward-based hundreds of miles away instead of on the ship. Additional tests of the Block IB missile are ongoing.In addition to regular testing of all PAA components, the United States will conduct two operational tests of the entire system’s capacity. These tests will be conducted by the armed forces rather than by the Missile Defense Agency. Both will test the system’s ability to defend against multiple simultaneous incoming missiles. The first operational test took take place in October 2012; the second will occur in FY2015.Test 1 Oct. 25, 2012Targets: 1 medium range ballistic missile MRBM, 2 short range ballistic missiles SRBM, 2 cruise missilesSensor: AN/TPY-2Weapon Systems: Aegis BMD, THAAD, PatriotResults: THAAD intercepted MRBM; PAC-3 intercepted SRBM and cruise missile; Aegis SM-2 IIIA intercepted cruise missile; Aegis SM-3 IA failed to intercept SRBM.Test 2 FY2015Targets: 1 SRBM, 1 MRBM, 1 ICBM, 2 IRBMsSensor: AN/TPY-2Weapon Systems: GMD, Aegis Ashore /Aegis BMD, THAAD, Patriot THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATYThe 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Treaty is a fundamental element of U.S. Arms control policy. This fact sheet reviews the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty, describes recent ABM Treaty developments, and lists the central elements of the Clinton Administration’s approach to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton is strongly committed to the viability of the ABM Treaty. Efforts on the part of this Administration to reaffirm the significance of the Treaty are described below. First, however, it is important to recall the basic framework of the Treaty Basic Framework of the ABM TreatyThe ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibits deployment of a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missile attack. In the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that each may have two precisely limited ABM deployment areas later limited by mutual agreement to one: to protect its capital or to protect an ICBM launch area. To promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, the Parties established the Standing Consultative Commission SCC, which meets at least twice a year. Also the terms of the Treaty specify that a review of the Treaty shall be conducted every five years.In 1974, the Parties to the Treaty agreed by means of a Protocol to reduce the number of permitted ABM deployment areas to one for each side. The Soviet Union chose to maintain and Russia continues to maintain an ABM defense of its national capital, Moscow. The United States chose-Lose to complete its Safeguard ABM system designed to defend its ICBM silo launcher area near Grand Forks, North Dakota; however, this system was operational for a very short time and has been inactive since 1976. Recent ABM Treaty DevelopmentsIn 1993, the Clinton Administration conducted a review of U.S. Policy towards Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of the ABM Treaty The Administration made a deter-mination that the “traditional” or “narrow” interpretation of the Treaty is the correct one. The Administration therefore reaffirmed that the ABM Treaty prohibits the develop-ment, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arose. The United States has made clear its position that it is willing to accept as Treaty Parties any of the New Independent States NIS that want to be Party to the Treaty. At the same time, the growing threat posed by theater ballistic missiles, and the need to combine effective protection against such threats while avoiding development of an ABM capability, has prompted the U.S. To propose that the demarcation between ABM and non-ABM defenses be clarified. The ABM Treaty itself does not provide clear guidance on this question. This clarification is being negotiated in the Treaty’s imple-menting forum, the Standing Consultative Commission. The Fourth Review of the ABM TreatyDuring the regular five-year ABM Treaty Review that took place from September 27 October 1, 1993, in Geneva, the United States explored the issues of ABM/non-ABM demarcation and succession with Russia and the other participating states, Ukraine and Belarus. The United States was reassured during this review that other states shared the view of the Treaty’s principal obligations and of the need to strengthen the Treaty. In the Joint Communique that was adopted at the Treaty Review, the partici-pating states concluded that: Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty The Standing Consultative Commission SCCIn the past, many issues related to theater and strategic defenses have been vigo-rously debated within a number of different fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the ABM Treaty, remains the forum for negotiation of and agreement on ABM Treaty issues. The United States and Russia, along with other potential successor states, are working together to develop an effective ABM Treaty regime that will provide for multilateral succession to the ABM Treaty, as well as clarify the dividing line between ABM and non-ABM defenses. At recent sessions of the SCC, which were held in Geneva from November 29 – December 17, 1993, January 24 – February 4, 1994, and March 21 – April 21, 1994, the United States presented proposals designed to preserve the viability of the Treaty in light of the political and technological circumstances of the present day The other participating delegations have also introduced their own positions and ideas. Despite some differences of view, the negotiations have demonstrated that there exists a significant degree of commonality in the approach to theater missile defense among SCC participants. There is general agreement 1 that the threat of ballistic missile proliferation is real; 2 that there is a shared interest in being able to defend against this threat; and 3 that the ABM Treaty must be clarified to allow for the field-ing of adequate theater missile defenses. The Clinton Administration’s ABM PolicyThe central points of the Administration’s ABM policy are as follows:President Clinton has reaffirmed the U.S. Commitment to the ABM Treaty. The Administration considers it indispensable to stability, to the START I and START II reductions, and to longer-term reductions in strategic offensive arms. The Clinton Administration has reaffirmed the “narrow” or “traditional” interpretation of the ABM Treaty as the correct interpretation, i.e., the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, airbased, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.The Administration has withdrawn the broad revisions to the Treaty previously pro-posed in the SCC which were intended to permit expanded deployment of strategic ABM defenses. The Administration has recognized the need to specify a dividing line between ABM systems limited by the Treaty and non-ABM systems. When the Treaty was nego-tiated, both parties understood that this demarcation was left undefined. The time has come to define it. This will be accomplished by agreement in the SCC, not unilaterally. How the final agreement is formalized, as a legal matter, must properly await the out-come of the negotiations. Finally, the President has directed the Administration to con-sult closely with Congress on these issues. CHRONOLOGYJuly 13, 1993: Narrow Interpretation of the ABM Treaty Endorsed by the Clinton Administration. On July 13,1993, Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided Senator Claiborne Pell D-RI, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with the Clinton Administration’s reaffirmation of the “narrow” or “traditional” interpretation of the ABM Treaty: the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of Sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized. September/October 1993: Fourth Review of the ABM TreatyThe Fourth Review of the ABM Treaty, held between September 27 and October 1 of 1993, reaffirmed the participants’ commitment to the ABM Treaty and advocated efforts to strengthen the Treaty. December 1993: U.S. Decision on ABM Treaty Succession The Clinton Administration announced its acceptance of multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and directed that negotiations begin on procedures to implement a multilateral succession. December 1993: U.S. Position on Theater Missile DefenseThe Clinton Administration announced its goal to seek a clear, negotiated, demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems in order to clarify the ABM Treaty provisions. November 29 – December 17,1993; January 24 – February 4, 1994; and March 21 April 21, 1994:Sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission were held in Geneva, Switzerland, where Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States discussed proposals to provide for multilateral succession to the ABM Treaty and to clarify the demarcation between ABM systems limited by the Treaty and non-ABM systems.In the light of Finland, Sweden and Ukraine joining NATO. CAN NATO REALY DEFEND OUR FREEDOM?Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force.REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO’S EASTERN FLANK Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway. NATO today is not able to defend it’s most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it’s uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers! A RAND CORPORATION STUDYRussias’s Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO’sNATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERSIn a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. THE SUWALKI GAP NATO’S NIGHTMARE DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATOThe outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. NATO’S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATESVladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors. After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution. The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs. This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them. In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. . Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words. MILITARY GEOGRAPHY FAVORS RUSSIA During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict see Figure 1. The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact. They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack. The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway versus crow-flight distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of scarce NATO forces to secure. The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment. Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District MD—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present. CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli. The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began. The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn. The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals. The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field. Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. Counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions. Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6. Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements. The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. Airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000. Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries. Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia. NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics. On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind or worse, but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications. Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself? The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances. The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. Homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga. Coupled with the general direction of U.S. Defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable. The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylonNATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. Airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high. Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above. Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome. We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days. Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces. At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. Combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days. Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression. There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering. Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units. This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. Armor brigade combat team ABCT to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position. In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. Maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. Units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced surface-to-air defens- es. Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign. This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon. Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. Corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do. The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe. Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps. THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable. Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances. All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones. For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s. Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main. Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of 13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists. Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than 13 billion. The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly 2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than 35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than 1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it. It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security. Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. Allies and partners worldwide. The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe. RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat. World War III Starts Here The Hottest Place on Planet Earthis not North Korea, Iran, and Taiwan, but this Radar Installation already targeted for destruction by the Russian Air Force. The total obliviating of Globus II and Globus III “Space Fence” Radar installations on the tiny Vardø Island at the very tip of Northern Norway will be the first sign of a rapidly progressing World War III Globus 3 Illustration by Harald DahleTu-22M3Backfire bomber: Close encounters with the Globus III installation U.S. Space Fence on Vardo Island, Northern Norway We welcome U.S. Space Fence in Norway, but will it be to the best of the population who will be caught in the middle? GLOBUS 3 on Vardo Island will be one of the very first targets in a potential new conflict with Russia. Artwork by Petrofilm.The Norwegian leadership lives in the delusion that a unilateral bond with the US will save the country. The permit for the use of thermonuclear bombs of type B61-12 from Norwegian soil, owned and operated by the Americans, will be a guarantee for Norway, the management believes. Yes, it is a guarantee, but for the collective downfall of the Norwegian people. Norway has around 5.3 million inhabitants in an area swelled in from Oslo to Rome. Only half of Norway’s population is strong enough to take the first hours of the war. The rest of the population is elderly, sick, children, pregnant, in prisons and in miserable form. Norway is a peacetime territory, but it is almost impossible to go to war. To that the country is too far, too cumbersome and too sparsely populated, and with a defense that is as good as defeated already. NATO started as a defense alliance but has become an attack alliance that has called in Russia and sees the country as its greatest enemy. Norway has hung on and gone from being a friendly neighbor to Russia, to becoming an offensive and provocative neighbor. This does not worry today’s management in Norway. But it should, because Norway’s ability to save its population lies in a good relationship with the neighbor in the east.NATO EXPAND EASTWARDUS STRYKERs IN POLANDHello friends! In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, President Ba- rack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: We will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. This view is good in theory, but is it wise to risk a global nu- clear melt down because of Tallin and Riga? I don’t think so.General Dynamics Land Systems, IAV, Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker.The newly published RAND Report underlines that despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that, NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conventional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast, a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Poland, along the Baltic Sea coast, totaling 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.General Dynamics Land Systems, IAV, Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker. In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of Tallinn, President Barack Obama arti culated and strongly affirmed that commitment: We will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. This view is good, in theory! But is it wise to risk a global nuclear meltdown because of Tallin, Riga and Vilnius? I don’t think so! And I think I have Germany with me on this. “ANAKONDA-16″A new missile crisis is building, in a mirror image of that which led the Soviet Union in 1962 to deploy nuclear warheads in Cuba, at the doorstep of the United States. Today, the situation is the reverse. At the time, NATO was fighting the Warsaw Pact, today, it is organizing a summit in Warsaw! THE NATO POLAND BALTIC EXERCISEThe largest war game in eastern Europe since the end of the cold war has started in Poland, as Nato and partner countries seek to mount a display of strength as a response to concerns about Russia’s assertiveness and actions. The 10-day military exercise, involving 31,000 troops and thousands of vehicles from 24 countries, has been welcomed among Nato’s allies in the region, though defence experts warn that any mishap could prompt an offensive reaction from Moscow.A defence attache at a European embassy in Warsaw said the “nightmare scenario” of the exercise, named Anaconda-2016, would be “a mishap, a miscalculation which the Russians construe, or choose to construe, as an offensive action”.NATO IS CARRYING OUT A PROVOCATIVE POLICY OF “ENCIRCLEMENT”Polish Honor Guard, ANACONDA-16The continuous eastward expansion of NATO towards the borders of Russia, despite the guarantees given by the West to Gorbachov in 1989 that this would not happen; The deployment of the Aegis anti-missile defense system in Romania, Poland, Turkey and Spain. These weapons, equipped with MK41 launchers, can be used for defensive missions air, land, sea, but also for offensive attacks with nuclear weapons. The planned permanent rotational deployment in the Baltic States, Poland and Romania, of four battalions of 1,000 troops each, and heavy military equipment; The creation of a “Nordic Front” against Russia, comprised of an alliance of NATO members Denmark, Iceland and Norway, and of NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” Sweden and Finland The modernization of nuclear weapons, in particular the B61-12 bomb and the Long Range Standoff LRSO Cruise Missiles, based in Germany. U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein said of these weapons: “The so-called improvements to this weapon seemed to be designed… To make it more usable, to help us fight and win a limited nuclear war.” To escape the current countdown to nuclear war, we also call on our government to create without delay the conditions for a new global peace and security architecture, based on the win-win cooperation proposed by the BRICS, cooperation which Europe and the United States, in their own interests, should join in. The vast efforts we deployed in the 20th Centu- ry for war, must be mobilized today for peace and mutual development! The German Bundeswehr is planning to deploy its soldiers in Lithuania as part of NATOs mission aimed at containing possible Russian aggression Russian Permanent Representative to NATO Alexander Grushko’s interview with Izvestia, published April 1, 2016 Alexander Grushko Question: How does Russia assess the U.S. Intention to deploy another armour brigade in Eastern Europe? Alexander Grushko: We need to see how these intentions play out. Nevertheless, we assess these plans not only in terms of what the United States can additionally deploy on NATO’s “eastern flank” but also in the context of the aggregate measures that have already been taken. Regarding the new force deployment pattern on NATO’s “eastern periphery”, this involves a qualitative change in the configuration of this presence and a significant deterioration of the situation in the military sphere. Presently, US forces are constantly rotated in six Eastern European countries and there are continuous exercises with the participation not only of US but also European contingents. The naval grouping in the Baltic has been reinforced. Storage depots have been set up for equipment used by rotation units during joint exercises with national contingents. Troop reinforcement infrastructure continues to be upgraded. Military activity in the airspace along our borders has intensified. The number of reconnaissance flights has drastically increased. There is constant talk about increasing the military presence in the Black Sea. All of this goes to show that the “containment” policy that was initially declared in word is now followed up by specific military-planning decisions. This creates a long-term negative trend not only for regional security but also for European security as a whole. Another problem is that no one knows how far this process will go. The decision to deploy an additional armour brigade is announced at a time when nothing critical is happening with regard to NATO interests on the “eastern flank”.It is becoming increasingly obvious that these military preparations have no basis in reality. There is no direct threat either to Poland or to the Baltic countries but the information campaign continues to gather momentum. Absurd horror stories to the effect that Russia would have attacked the Baltic countries if NATO had not taken measures and deployed its troops in the region continue making the rounds. All indications point to a serious change for the worse in the military situation. Question: Are there grounds to say that NATO actions violate agreements with Russia, in particular the Founding Act of 1997? Alexander Grushko: An additional armour brigade to reinforce the “eastern flank” is in conflict with the spirit of the Founding Act. Meanwhile, NATO alleges that all military efforts are in full compliance with the Russia-NATO Founding Act whereby NATO pledged not to deploy additional significant combat forces on a permanent basis. We have stated more than once that continuous rotation does not differ in any way from constant deployment. I should point out, however, that two bases of the European segment of the global missile defence system are under construction. The base in Romania is now at combat readiness and is due to be placed under NATO command in May. The construction of the facility in Poland is in progress. The bases definitely fall under the definition of “significant” and have a permanent character. Question: In what way will the strengthening of the US contingent impact Russia-NATO collaboration? Alexander Grushko: In no way. There is no collaboration. In April 2014, NATO countries took the decision to halt all collaboration with Russia and all projects were put on hold. Today, we do not have a positive agenda with NATO. We often hear NATO representatives say they are ready for dialogue. Dialogue through the permanent mission continues. We have good contacts with the alliance leadership, with all missions to NATO, but these contacts cannot substitute for the Russia-NATO collaboration that was built over the years to ensure the security of all Russia-NATO Council members in a number of areas. We worked together on Afghanistan. We did a good deal of work in fighting terrorism not only in terms of threat assessment and sharing experience but also in implementing projects designed to rule out tragedies like the one in Brussels. Question: What is the status of the Russia-NATO Council activity? Alexander Grushko: Formally, the council activity has not been halted. Upon our initiative, it was convened for an emergency meeting in June 2014 in connection with the start of a punitive operation by the Kiev authorities in southeastern Ukraine. No meetings have been held since. Work is underway for the next meeting but no decision has been made yet. Question: Can the CFE Treaty be invoked in the present situation? Alexander Grushko: The US military buildup is proceeding amid the erosion of the arms control regime in Europe. The CFE regime was the cornerstone of European security. It set ceilings on the main categories of weapon systems and ensured effective information-sharing and an intrusive verification regime. In the early 1990s, it became clear that the treaty did not measure up to the new political realities and adaptation talks began. These efforts ended up with the signing of the Adapted CFE Treaty. It was more in sync with the new realities. In particular, it envisioned specific mechanisms of using political tools in case forces are deployed above the established quota limits. In 2004, Russia ratified the treaty, but NATO countries dragged their feet on the ratification under contrived pretexts. As a result, it did not come into effect. As the CFE Treaty has lost contact with reality, there is reason to say that the arms control regime in Europe is now dead. This further compounds the security situation. However, this choice was made by the NATO countries themselves.
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